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# Framing China: how U.S. media reported eight U.S. state visits by top Chinese leaders

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**Framing China:  
How U.S. media reported eight U.S. state visits by top Chinese leaders**

by

**Yao Chang**

A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
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Program of Study Committee:  
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You are my hero.

I want to give this thesis to my daughter Ava as her seven-month-old present. She doesn’t know how to read yet, but I bet she will like it.

She is my angel.



**ABSTRACT**

This thesis examined ways in which eight Chinese leaders' state visits to the United States have been portrayed in terms of coverage and news framing in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Time*, and *Newsweek*. This study included content analysis of both text and photos. It was expected that the content would match the underlying political and economic situations. However, results show coverage does not always fit into economic and political categories. Exceptions occurred when unexpected incidents took place such as protests in the Tiananmen Square Incident. Generally, text coverage was balanced, with positive and negative items in most stories. Photos tended to be more positive than text as a result of planned news photo opportunities to present the welcoming moments to visiting leaders. *The New York Times* had the greatest volume of coverage.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Today, China-U.S. bilateral diplomatic relations are one of the world's most important. Over time, the images of Chinese in the U.S. media have changed. It might be expected that the base for determining coverage of top Chinese leaders during their state visits to the United States would be the underlying political and economic themes of each particular time period. Previous research has proposed that at least five factors may potentially influence how journalists frame Chinese leaders' visits: Economics and trade, political relations, Taiwan, leadership characteristics and ideology.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the ways in which the Chinese leaders' state visits to the United States have been portrayed in terms of coverage and news framing in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Time*, and *Newsweek*. Between 1979, when China-U.S. diplomatic relations were formally established, and 2006, Chinese leaders made eight state visits to the United States. Thus eight Chinese top leaders' images were examined, including three Presidents (Li Xiannian, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao), four Prime Ministers (Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, Zhu Rongji, Wen Jiabao) and one Chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee (Wan Li). The research will follow a time chronology, from Deng Xiaoping's first visit (also China's first state visit) in 1979 to Hu Jintao's 2006 visit.

In the 28 years from 1979 to 2006, China-U.S. relations have had changed greatly. Some have occurred during times of optimism. Others, such as one following the Tiananmen Square incident, have been negative.

Chinese top leaders represented China's national image. National image is often called a national stereotype—a generalized, abstract profile of a nation or its people (Yu, 1964). National image is the product of a complex historical process involving the interplay of many factors, such as the political and social realities of a particular country, diplomatic relations, and changes in the international political and economic spheres as well as symbolic representations in mass media and popular culture. The photo can be used to identify motion, expression and activity of the figures and the environment surrounding them. A pre-coding test showed that U.S. media like to focus on visiting Chinese leaders' characteristics and personalities to see if these can represent the larger Chinese national image in a certain period of time. Results showed that media recognized leaders with approachable humanity, versatility, and democratic spirit, and captured interesting moments in the photos. Meanwhile, media provided texts to interpret the leader's political philosophy and role of the government.

The vast majority of Americans rely on mass media to learn about developments in China. China, a geographically distant country drastically different from the United States in almost every aspect—history, culture, political system, lifestyle—was known as Red China in the late 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. During the first visit of President Richard Nixon to China following “ping-pong” diplomacy, Americans began to hear different ideas about China. State visits provided an opportunity for the U.S. public to understand China and Chinese leaders in new ways. By analyzing the portrayal of Chinese leaders during their state visits to the United States, many of the Chinese national images and possible U.S. media frames towards China can be identified. Also, during state visits, crucial current issues and hot topics between the two countries would be discussed and intensively reported. Thus, by examining each Chinese leader's state visit, frames used to characterize individual leaders

and also the larger frames involving relations and issues between the two countries can be identified. The leaders' images framed in U.S. media also let the Chinese see how their American friends view them.

In this research, each state visit was treated as a special case study, with the relevant text and photo reports examined. Several variables including text/photo frequency, number of words/photo sizes, news source, section, tone and frames were coded. The media frames, including three major media frames (political relations, economics and trade, and the Taiwan issue) and other important frames in China-U.S. relations found in the Chinese leaders' state visit reports were examined. Data from different visits were sorted and compared using SPSS software.

This study will contribute to a limited literature that examines both text and photo framing. It will also contribute to the limited research analyzing leaders' images in state visits. It will provide reporters, photojournalists and editors with a longitudinal database to understand the past 28 years of China-U.S. relations across topics such as politics, economics, Taiwan, and changes in ideology. By examining the combined text/photo portrayal of the top leaders, we can see the whole picture of the U.S. media's attitude towards Chinese leaders, and also the U.S. attitude towards China.

## CHAPTER 2

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This study aims to examine how newspapers and magazines in the United States textually and visually framed the state visits of eight Chinese leaders to the United States. The study also compared patterns of coverage during state visits with underlying political and economic events of the times.

This research followed the structural pattern of media content studies. That is, mass media structure their content as an interpretation of reality for audiences, and the media content is shaped by a variety of factors that result in different versions of reality, such as political and economic factors.

In this research, the main research questions were proposed with the expectation that media content has frames produced by considering the political and economic background of China-U.S. relations. Thus, framing theories will be used. Political and economic background information on the eight Chinese leaders' state visits to the U.S. will be provided for each leader's case study to better understand the context of each visit.

#### **Framing theory**

Journalists, like all human beings, tend to see what they recognize. Gamson and Modigliani have noted that journalists organize news stories in ways that provide meaning to related events (1989). Goffman (1974) was one of the earliest scholars to define the framing concept, which is the "principle of organization which governs events--at least social ones--and our subjective involvement in them"(p.11). Goffman also describes frames as "strips" of everyday life that help people organize what they see.

Entman (1993) further refined framing as a theory. He defines framing as a process to

“select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text [or visual], in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (1993, 52). He defines salience as “making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences” (Entman, 1993, p.53). In addition, Entman (1993) states frames “are manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters or facts of judgment.”

Entman points out that frames have four locations: the communicator, the text [or image], the receiver, and the culture. He notes that the frames basically perform four functions; they: (1) define problems, (2) diagnose causes, (3) make moral judgments, and (4) suggest remedies. This study focuses on the first two functions.

A news frame is defined as “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation of selection emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual” (Gitlin, 1980). According to Gitlin (1980), news texts contain largely unspoken and unacknowledged "media frames" that organize the world both for journalists who report news and, to some important degree, for consumers who rely on their reports.

### **Media Framing**

According to McQuail (2005, p.555), there are two key meanings of the concept of framing. One refers to the way in which news content is typically shaped and contextualized by journalists within some familiar frame of reference and according to some latent structure of meaning. A second, related meaning concerns the effect of framing on the public. The

audience is thought to adopt the frames of reference offered by journalists and to see the world in a similar way. The subject within the frame becomes more salient than subjects outside the frame. This study focuses on the first level framing—the media framing, investigating how different media constructed news reports about visits of Chinese leaders.

Entman (1991) asserts that news frames are constructed from and embodied in the keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols, and visual images emphasized in a news narrative. Since the narrative finally consists of nothing more than words and pictures, frames can be detected by probing for particular words and visual images that consistently appear in a narrative and convey thematically consonant meanings across media and time. By providing, repeating, and thereby reinforcing words and visual images that reference some ideas but not others, frames work to make some ideas more salient in the text, others less so, and others entirely invisible. He points out that the relationship between text and image, which is the frame, does not eliminate all inconsistent information: text inevitably contains some incongruent data. But through repetition, replacement, and reinforcing associations with each other, the words and images that comprise the frame render one basic interpretation more readily discernible, comprehensible, and memorable than others. Many studies dealing with the news-making process conclude that news media, far from conveying “value-free” or “ideology-free” objective reality, actively help to construct and reconstruct social reality by presenting a particular news frame. (Youngchul & Gwangho, 2002)

### **Determinants of international news flow and coverage**

#### **Economic factor**

International news does not flow evenly and uniformly across national boundaries (He, 2003). He summarized several key factors involved in international news flow and coverage,

including population, GDP, GDP per capita, military power, trade, colonial ties, geographic distance, and language. In this study, economic factors were chosen as one key factor for news coverage about the eight Chinese leaders' visits.

### **Ideology and political factors**

The ideological or political orientations of journalists are one influential factor determining how journalists frame news coverage in mass media (Van Dijk, 1985). Journalists unconsciously rely on their own values in writing news stories and absorb assumptions of the social world in which the news is embedded (White, 1950; Hackett, 1984). As Hall notes, ideology is most effective when it becomes “natural, universal, and coterminous with reality itself” (1986:65). In the case of examining ideological influences on the coverage of visiting Chinese leaders, it is expected that government ideology exerted a powerful and noticeable influence on story presentation.

As journalists try to make events understood by readers in the form of news stories, they must inevitably draw on frames. These frames are most likely to come from the limited ideological or explanatory repertoire available in the dominant culture (Hall, 1977). Thus journalists do their ‘ideological work’ in a non-coercive process, at the moment of framing. They choose their frames from the limited field of dominant meanings – meanings which have become ‘universalized and naturalized’ and thus appear to be the only forms of intelligibility available (Hall, 1977).

Political U.S. news frames would be expected to reflect the American government’s political agenda and foreign policy. Past studies have shown that with regard to China reporting, there were strong parallel relationships between the American press reporting and government policies. Fishman (1982) describes the process of the “bureaucratic subsidization



of the news” in which the media are gatherers of news produced by government organizations. The government may withhold information and distort the reality to meet its public relations objectives. Reporters also need to establish good working relationships with government officials. There is an incentive to avoid publishing information which would aggravate the source and thus threaten the symbiotic source-reporter relationship. In these ways, news is shaped to become more supportive of the government. Thus, information that finds its way to the media is generally harmonious with the position of the government in power. The beat system, which most media subscribe to in one form or another, is generally organized along the lines of government offices.

Rachlin (1988) argued that the meaning of world events was often portrayed consistently with the images and interpretations of the host country's national interests and political or cultural perspectives. Fishman (1982) asserted that the U.S. media redefined public reality by using government schemes of interpretation. He argued that in reporting international news, a nation's media rallied around the flag and reported the news in a manner consistent with interpretations in their own country.

According to Youngchul and Gwangho (2002), the government-press relationship depends on how closely the press is connected with the government. There is an incentive for the government to give favors to pro-government newspapers while discriminating against the anti-government newspapers. Some newspapers are more closely linked with the government than others. Given that news is the product of the interaction of two bureaucracies, one composed of journalists and the other of government news sources—differences in news coverage are found between pro-government papers and opposition papers. The existence of organizational imperatives requires reporters to rely on government sources, and at the same

time, the news media also maintain relative autonomy to construct news frames tailored to their own ideological or political views.

According to Murdock and Golding (1977), three types of ideology may be expected to exert primary influence on the framing of news: (1) dominant ideology, (2) elite ideology and (3) journalistic ideology, or ‘occupational ideology’.

Previous research has proposed that at least five factors may potentially influence how journalists frame a given issue: social norms and values, organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups, journalistic routines, and ideological or political orientations of journalists (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tuchman, 1978). The way news is framed in the mass media is a result of social and professional routines of journalists (Van Dijk, 1985). Entman (1993), who concluded that the choice of frames often is "driven by ideology and prejudice," echoes this finding. Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997) assert that journalists' common reliance on elite sources for quotes, insight, analysis, and information means that the media often serve as conduits for individuals eager to promote a certain perspective to a broader public reliance. They regard those elites as the source of many frames and framing devices, and assert that this makes news organizations readily construct media frames on their own in order to summarize concisely the kernel of a story (Nelson et al., 1997). In this study, political officials were main actors in the state visits and their announcements were often quoted by reporters. Political officials were regarded as elites for these reports.

News media in relation to other institutions, especially political institutions, often rely heavily on “politically elite” news sources by focusing on presidents, governments, members of Congress and military figures (Gans, 1979; Roscho, 1975; Sigal, 1973). And the “modus

operandi” of media coverage of politics tends to be structured around official agencies and organizations, resulting in a bias toward politically elite news sources. (Park, Tajima & Nah, 2006 )

Kim (1999) further demonstrated the point by examining *The New York Times* and the *The Washington Post* news coverage of two similar East Asian political movements in the 1980s-- the Kwangju movement in South Korea and the Tiananmen movement in China that are reported in a manner that coincided with U.S. government definitions. The study demonstrated the interdependent relationships between the U.S. media and government by reviewing attributions in news stories and examining favorability of the U.S. elite newspapers towards two similar news events.

### **Five major media frames**

Based on previous studies, it was expected that five major areas of framing would be important in the current study. Each will now be discussed briefly. We began with five news frames (political relations, economics and trade, Taiwan, leadership characteristics, and ideology) identified in previous research. Political relations frames refer to the American government’s political agenda and foreign policy. Past studies have shown that with regard to reporting about China, there were strong parallel relationships between the American press and government policies. The two countries are both politically powerful nations. When their leaders meet, the wrestling between the two nations driven by political strategies can be presented in the media portrait of each other’s top leaders. Economic frames emphasize the economic development and action of China, economic relations between United States and China, and economic consequences of mutual economic actions and policies on the two nations. Focusing on this frame is largely the result of globalization of American society. For

the most part, the ideological rhetoric and the images of China reinforced this notion of positive trade relations and the idea that economic liberalization in China would eventually lead to political reform. The Taiwan issue is one of the most sensitive issues in China-U.S. relations. The level of tension among China-Taiwan-U.S. relations has varied over time. The Taiwan frame refers to any discussion in news reports about Taiwan. The ideology frame refers to ideological and social values. The American news media portrayal of foreign countries often reflects the dominant ideology of the host country (Yu and Riffe, 1988). Especially when China is recognized as a communist and socialist country operating under a different ideology system from the United States, news reporting is often motivated by ideology rather than newsworthiness. Common framing terms might be “red China,” “communism,” “socialism,” “demonize,” “potential enemy” and so on. The leadership frame was found to be a frame in international news. In studies concerning international relations, leadership characteristics have been found to be an important factor in how nations interact (Luther & Zhou, 2005).

### **Sources**

In this study, it was hypothesized that reporters would consider the political strategies of the government for each visit and also the climate of public opinion at the time of each visit. In times of tension between China and the United States, it was expected that U.S. reporters might use more U.S. government sources. When relations were good, reporters might use both U.S. and China sources. It was also hypothesized that there were more sources coming from the government officials from both countries who were considered political elites. Although the media gather information from a variety of sources, the most widely used news sources are bureaucratic organizations in which a large amount of newsworthy information is

processed and accumulated on a daily basis (Gans, 1979; Sigal, 1973; Roscho, 1975). Thus, according to Park, Tajima and Nah (2003), consequently, news gathering procedures tend to be structured around organizations such as government agencies, political parties, big corporations and other “legitimized” social institutions. By focusing on information-rich locales, reporters thus ensure they have access to a stable and continuous supply of news.

### **Visual Framing**

In this study, it was hypothesized that the tone of photos would be similar to that of the text due to the political and economic themes underlying each Chinese leader’s specific state visit. As with text, visual images are capable of producing documentary evidence to support the common-sensical claims of ideology, and in turn to use the very appearance of nature to subtly camouflage the constructed, historical, and social roots of ideology (Hall, 1986).

According to Barthes (1977), the press photograph is defined as a message, and the newspaper is defined as a complex of concurrent messages with the photograph as center and text, the title, the caption, the layout as the surrounding.

According to Hicks (1952), the photographer is not interested in form alone or in content alone. The closer a photographer can come to merging form and content, the better the picture. The ideal in photography, as in painting, is a perfect coming together of what is said with the way in which it is said.

Photographers and designers have long been aware of the power of visual images. Not only words and paragraphs, but also the images, pictures and photos will fairly represent journalists’ attitudes in news reporting. According to Patridge (2005), visual framing refers to three characteristics listed by Messaris and Abraham about how a viewer interprets an image: analogical, indexical, and propositional syntax. According to Messaris and Abraham (2001),

the central characteristic of images, which most clearly distinguishes them from words, is the fact that images constitute a largely analogical system of communication, whereas words are almost wholly arbitrary.

Messaris and Abraham (2001) also conclude that indexicality of images, the connection between photograph and reality, has a certain authenticity that a human-made picture can never have. The propositional syntax of images, on the other hand, is similar to that of verbal syntax, but does not really have the same well-defined conventions. It randomly creates causality, comparisons, generalizations, and many other connections.

The third characteristic has to do with the relationship between images—that is, the visual syntax (Messaris and Abraham, 2001). They found that visual communication does not have an explicit set of syntactic conventions for interpreting syntactic meaning as does verbal language. Visual propositions are more reliant on the viewer's ability to make intuitive sense of implicit meanings on the basis of contextual or other cues.

For the analysis of the photograph, Barthes (1977) pointed out that the structure of the photograph is not an isolated structure. It is in communication with at least one other structure, namely the text—title, caption or article—accompanying every press photograph, these two structures are co-operative but, the photograph analysis must first bear on its own separate structure, such as lines, surfaces, shades, etc.

The text constitutes a parasitic message designed to connote the image, to 'quicken' it with one or more second-order signifiers. In other words, and this is an important historical reversal, the image no longer illustrates the words; it is now the words which, structurally, are parasitic on the image.

Secondly, the effect of connotation probably differs according to the way in which the

text is presented. The closer the text to the image, the less it seems to connote it.

Visual images also communicate ideology. According to Hall (1986), visual images are capable of producing documentary evidence to support the commonsensical claims of ideology, and in turn to use the very appearance of nature to subtly camouflage the constructed, historical, and social roots of ideology. In this study, one of the four frames being selected is ideology. Thus, the visual framing can be analyzed in terms of its ideological message.

### **Publications**

The sample of the study consisted of both newspaper and magazine articles and photos about the state visits in *the New York Times*, *the Washington Post*, *Time*, and *Newsweek*.

### **China-U.S. relations in different periods**

Previous studies of China-U.S. relations presented in media reports chronologically classified the time periods of the relations by important historical events that happened between the two countries.

Wang (1998) conducted a historical analysis of *The New York Times*' coverage of four watershed China-U.S. events: Nixon's trip to China in 1972, the student demonstration at Tiananmen Square in 1989, the APEC summit in 1993, and China's military exercises in 1996. A discourse and ideological analysis was conducted to examine *The New York Times* since there had been great ideological differences between the United States and China.

For example, Peng's (2004) research about representation of China in *The New York Times* and *Los Angeles Times* applied a cross-time analysis by dividing Chinese images in the United States into four categories: the Red China, the Green China, the Dark China, and the Gray China from 1949 to present, each with different socioeconomic characteristics. The

attitudes toward China in the four different time periods were examined by two independent variables: the overall tone and the media frames. In Peng's study, he identified three media frames: the political frame, the ideological frame, and the economic frame. In the current study, Peng's categories were applied with one extra category added – "rising China" for the year's after 2001. The major political and economic events that happened in those time periods will be listed below. It was expected that these political and economic events would affect the media frames and content.

### **The Red China (before 1979)**

Red, communist, and conservative were the words used to describe China's image before 1979. However, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China in 1979 indicated a whole new period for the two countries. This early period was not included in this study since no state visits occurred in the United States.

### **The Green China (1979-1989) -- China-U.S. Diplomatic Relations established**

Green is used to symbolize the American media's image of a promising China. Formal diplomatic ties lessened the political and ideological tensions between the two countries, and China's Reform and Opening policy encouraged the American media to cover China in a more objective and favorable way. Dorogi (2000) argued that news reports during this period concentrated on the reformist nature of the Deng regime while de-emphasizing the political constraints that were characteristic of Chinese political culture in this era. Chang (1989) also found significant differences between the two periods before and after the normalization of China-U.S. relations in the amount of news space, types of items, subject matter, sources, attitude directions, and illustrations in Chinese news in *The New York Times*. Chang (1989)



found that in this period representations of China in American newspapers shifted from the use of ideological and emotional symbols before 1979 to that of legal and precise symbols after 1979. It was expected that the overall tone towards leaders' visits during this period would be mostly positive.

High-level exchanges continued to be a significant means for developing China-U.S. relations in this period. President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang made reciprocal visits in 1984. In July 1985, President Li Xiannian traveled to the United States, the first such visit by a Chinese head of state. Vice President George H.W. Bush visited China in October 1985 and opened the U.S. Consulate General in Chengdu, the United States' fourth consular post in China. Further exchanges of cabinet-level officials occurred between 1985-1989, capped by President Bush's visit to Beijing in February 1989.

The U.S. media emphasized economic cooperation, China's opening and modernization aspects during the three state visits. Thus, the United States as well as the world has a stake in China's economic progress, national security, and political vitality (Sino-US relations, 2005). The United States hoped to see the continuing implementation of economic and political reforms, which undoubtedly will also help advance these goals.

In the period before the June 4, 1989, the Tiananmen Square Protest, a large and growing number of cultural exchange activities undertaken at all levels gave the American and Chinese peoples broad exposure to each other's cultural, artistic, and educational achievements. Numerous mainland Chinese professional and official delegations visited the United States each month. Many of these exchanges continued after the suppression of the Tiananmen protests.

Because of the change in the balance between military force of the Soviet Union and the

United States, the American strategy in the Cold War was evenhandedness between Moscow and Beijing, and the beginning of a U.S.-China military relationship was traceable to the rapidly growing Soviet military force. In response to the changes in U.S. policy, the Chinese media increasingly depicted the United States as rising to the challenge of Soviet “hegemonism” and abandoning appeasement.

China and the United States resumed trade relations in 1972 and 1973. U.S. direct investment in mainland China covers a wide range of manufacturing sectors, several large hotel projects, restaurant chains, and petrochemicals (Bunton, 1979).

### **The Dark China(1989-1996)---- The Tiananmen Incident**

The Tiananmen Incident of June 4, 1989, marked an end to the era of American idealism with regard to American expectations of political and social liberalization, and this issue badly damaged China’s image in the United States. China-U.S. relations deteriorated, though they were not as bad as before Kissinger’s visit. Black can be the best description of China-U.S. relations following this incident. And it was expected that the U.S. media attitude towards China would be negative.

During this time period, no state visit to the United States occurred.

In 1992, when Deng began a tour to visit South China, and China’s economic growth began, the American media portrayed them facing a complicated and unpredictable China. Media attitudes, and also U.S. national attitudes were mixed. In 1995, President Li Denghui from Taiwan made an informal visit to Cornell University, and the United States held an ambiguous attitude towards Li’s attempt to create a “two China” image. China did a sham battle with missiles while the United States sent an aircraft carrier to the Taiwan Channel. In 1995-1996 the Taiwan Strait crisis evolved to a situation that the United States, China, and

Taiwan could endure, and the situation stabilized. It also marked an end of the Cold War era between China and the United States

After the ending of the Cold War, great changes took place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in late 1989 and early 1990. “Eastern Europe fever” seemed to surpass “China fever.” The development of the Persian Gulf War and the possibility for a peaceful solution of the Cambodia issue brought the United States and China somewhat closer.

United States economic and military assistance to China was reduced. However, though the feeling against China was strong in general, small-scale exchanges and visits among the two peoples were never completely suspended, since it would have been difficult to terminate all the ties established during the 1980s. Nor was it easy to stop the numerous successful joint ventures already operating in China. Still, restoring the relationship and ending the mutual bitterness seemed to be taking longer than one would like.

### **The Grey China (1996-2001)—Taiwan Strait Crisis**

This is the most mixed period with media attitudes toward China differentiated by topics.

Right after Li Denghui’s 1995 informal visit, the tension between the two countries rose and directly led to the sham battle practice in China. As a transitional point that brought an end to the post-Tiananmen period, the Taiwan crisis intensified domestic anxiety and fostered the myth that China had taken the place of the Soviet Union as the geopolitical adversary of the United States (Dorogi, 2001). According to Wang (1998), the Taiwan Strait crisis galvanized American fears of Chinese expansionism and military intimidation. However, on the economic and cultural communication sides, just after the second-half of the 1990s, American economic ties with China had been closely connected and strengthened. As a result, the emphasis of the media coverage of China was increasingly placed in a greater global

context, and the themes were greatly extended beyond the nature of the communist regime and human rights, to Chinese expansionism, economic development, and relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan.

However, the extreme tension led to a strategy to seek a resolution of the situation and better relations. Subsequently, tensions in the Taiwan Strait diminished, and relations between the United States and China improved, with increased high-level exchanges and progress on numerous bilateral issues, including human rights, nonproliferation, and trade. As a result of the political-economic transformations undertaken by China, the free market-ethic, procedural democracy, consumerism, and individualism attained a preeminent status in the international political sphere. The first high-level summit after the Tiananmen massacre of June 1989 was in 1997, when Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited the United States. In connection with that visit, the two sides concluded talks on the implementation of the 1985 agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation. Jiang Zemin's state visit had strengthened the position of those who wanted more stable China-U.S. relations and stronger business ties.

Seeking the opportunity to join WTO was a big topic in China during this period. In 1999, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji was campaigning across the United States (Marcus, 1999), drumming up popular support to revive an unfinished trade deal for China entering the WTO and projecting the image of a confident, friendly China. Mr. Zhu was direct and forceful on trade and other economic issues.

Relations between the United States and China were severely strained for a time by the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, which badly hurt China-U.S. relations. By the end of 1999, relations gradually began to improve. In October

1999 the two sides reached agreement on humanitarian payments for families of those who died and those who were injured as well as payments for damages to respective diplomatic properties in Belgrade and China.

### **The rising China (2001.9.11-present)—China's Economic Boom and 911**

China-U.S. relations changed radically following the September 11, 2001, attacks. China offered strong public support for the war on terrorism. Shortly after 911, the United States and China also commenced a counterterrorism dialogue. In the United States, the terrorist attacks greatly changed the nature of discourse. It was no longer plausible to argue that China was the primary security threat to the United States, and the need to focus on the Middle East and the War on Terror made it a priority for the United States to avoid potential distractions in East Asia. In addition, the United States' sense of rivalry towards China lessened and it began to seek more cooperation with China. China is considered the largest indirect beneficiary of 911. The media attitude during this period was supposed to be mixed, positive towards the development of China while the United States was keeping a vigilant eye on China's booming economic and political power that made the media attitude negative towards China in some cases.

On December 8, 2003, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao kicked off his three-day visit to the United States by ringing the opening bell at the New York Stock Exchange. It was a symbolic moment -- a leader of the Chinese Communist Party firing the starting gun for the capitalist running dogs of Wall Street. It symbolized China's tied economic relationship with the United States. Tensions were rising over trade and Taiwan. Mr. Wen hoped to quell trade tensions. Mr. Bush hoped to quell tensions over Taiwan from November 2003. However, Taiwan's parliament passed a law that would allow the island to hold national referendums.

Authorities in Beijing condemned the referendum law as a tool for separatists.

On April 20, 2006, Chinese president Hu Jintao (*The Economist*, 2006) paid his first presidential visit to the White House. Very positive and complex is how George Bush ambivalently characterized his country's relations with China. The two leaders were anxious to avoid letting their disputes seriously damage ties during this particularly sensitive time. China's rapid economic rise was said to pose a threat to American jobs, and the administration wanted China to help check the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea. China wanted America to restrain Taiwan, where the approach of presidential elections in 2008 was already threatening the island's uneasy relationship with the mainland.

**WTO and China's Peaceful Rising.** China's accession to the World Trade Organization was meant to help address many barriers. It affected the fundamental economic interests of both the United States and China. American opportunities to export to and invest in China would increase significantly, and the United States began to complain about the trade deficit and then brought out some trade conflict. However, China continued to announce its development strategy and principle to the world: "China is not trying to threaten any country in the world; it develops itself on a peaceful base, and tries to contribute to the world market and harmony. It is a peaceful rising."

**Taiwan.** During this period, China continued its steady economic growth and reiterated its commitment to a strategy of market reforms and global economic openness. At the September 2002 Joint Economic Committee meeting in Washington, the United States and China discussed strengthening cooperation in fighting terrorist finance and money laundering, prospects for foreign direct investment in mainland China's financial services, and the regional reliance on U.S. macroeconomic developments. China's continued strong growth has

made it an important regional engine of growth, and it also became an important partner with the United States in the world economy.

U.S. companies have entered agreements establishing more than 20,000 equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises in mainland China. More than 100 U.S.-based multinationals have projects in mainland China, some with multiple investments. Cumulative U.S. investment in mainland China is valued at \$48 billion. The U.S. trade deficit with mainland China exceeded \$350 billion in 2006 and was the United States' largest bilateral trade deficit. Total two-way trade between mainland China and the U.S. has grown from \$33 billion in 1992 to more than \$230 billion in 2004 (Bunton, 2005).

In this time period, Taiwan remains a volatile issue, but one that is under control. On occasion the United States has rebuked President Chen Shui-bian from Taiwan for provocative pro-independence rhetoric. However, in 2005, China passed an anti-secession law which stated that China would be prepared to resort to "non-peaceful means" if Taiwan declared formal independence.

### **Research Questions**

Four research questions are asked in this study:

RQ1: To what extent did the newspapers and magazines cover the Chinese leaders' visits?

RQ2: What kinds of media frames were used in both text and photo reports of the Chinese leaders' state visits?

RQ3: Were the media frames in the text and photo reports of the Chinese leaders' state visits constructed in terms of the political and economic themes that predominated in each

time period?

RQ4: Do the media differ in covering the state visits?



## CHAPTER 3

### METHODOLOGY

The purpose of the thesis is to investigate the frames used by U.S. media to portray Chinese leaders when they came to the United States. The study examined text and photos concerning eight state visits in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Time* and *Newsweek*. Of particular interest was seeing if the media frames over time coincided with underlying political and economic conditions. A content analysis of newspaper and magazine articles was conducted to answer the research questions.

#### **Content analysis**

Content analysis has been defined as a “research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (Berelson, 1952, p.13).

Wimmer and Dominick (2006, p.141) point out that content analysis is “a method of studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for purpose of measuring variables.” Content analysis is frequently used in foreign news coverage research because it can help researchers “learn about news reports” underlying attitudes, biases or repeated themes (Rubin and Piele, 1986) .

This study used content analysis in both quantitative and qualitative ways, including quantitative analysis of text, quantitative analysis of photos, qualitative analysis of text, and qualitative analysis of photos. A quantitative approach was used to determine the occurrence of report topics for comparison, which can be calculated through the frequency of content appearance. It can also be applied to analyze the importance of the visits by the frequency of occurrence. A qualitative approach was applied to examine emphasis placed on frames

through an in-depth look at images and texts about the state visits.

The stories to be analyzed include text and photo reports that focus on eight state visits by Chinese leaders in the four U.S. media from January 1979 to April 2006.

The unit of analysis was each entire story and photo published.

Two national newspapers and two magazines that form the core of American political-economic ideology were examined in this study. The rationale for selecting *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Time* and *Newsweek* is that they all report issues, events, and matters of public concern, and form the core of popular press reports on many international developments. Moreover, these newspapers and magazines constitute a genre of popular literature that is insightful, consecutive, and expressive of public opinions.

*The New York Times'* influence has been well documented in the literature (Wang, 1998), and it is widely regarded as the opinion leader of the U.S. press. Major newspapers across the country closely follow *The New York Times'* advisories in making their placement decisions. In addition, it is considered as an elite newspaper that enjoys wide readership among opinion leaders at home as well as abroad. *The New York Times* is currently owned by The New York Times Company, in which descendants of Adolph Ochs, principally the Sulzberger family, maintain a dominant role.

*The Washington Post* is generally regarded as one of the leading daily American newspapers. *The Washington Post*, unsurprisingly, has distinguished itself through its reporting on the workings of the White House, Congress, and other aspects of the U.S. government. It is obviously a voice about U.S. government to be examined in this study of the Chinese state visits. However, this newspaper can still be pioneer to open up scandals in the government such as "Watergate".

Both *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* are more in-depth and aimed at more educated readers. *The New York Times* is the most prestigious newspaper in the United States. Both newspapers are role models, and lead the tone and content of the media. *The Washington Post* is generally regarded as one of the leading daily American newspapers, along with *The New York Times*, which is known for its general reporting and international coverage. The Post has distinguished itself through its political reporting on the workings of the White House, Congress, and other aspects of the U.S. government.

*Time* and *Newsweek* magazines were also selected for analysis. Compared to newspapers, the two magazines focus on political and general news, and are representative of public interests and trends at any given time period.

*Time* stands for "The International Magazine of Events." *Newsweek* is an American weekly newsmagazine published in New York City and distributed throughout the United States and internationally. According to Dorogi (2001), they all review issues, events, and matters of public concern on a weekly basis and form the core of popular press reports on many international developments.

### **Questions/codebook**

This study used Patridge's (2005) methodology for analyzing photos and texts together. This included both quantitative and qualitative analysis of both body text and images. The analysis includes four parts: (1) quantitative analysis of text; (2) quantitative analysis of the photos; (3) qualitative analysis of text; (4) qualitative analysis of the photos.

### **Quantitative analysis of text**

To answer research question 1 (To what extent did the newspapers and magazines cover the Chinese leaders' visits?) and research question 2 (What kinds of media frames were used

in both text and photo reports of the Chinese leaders' state visits?) a quantitative analysis of text and photos was performed.

Quantitative analysis of body text includes the number of articles, number of words in an article, total number of words, placement on the page, sources, people quoted, dominant frames, total frames, dominant tone and positive or negative tones presented in a single textual report published for each state visit.

### **Number of articles**

Text reports about Chinese leaders' visits were selected and coded based on a "topic-related" and "four days ahead or later" basis. Any articles mentioning the specific leader's state visit to the U.S. within a time frame from the fourth day before the actual state visit starting date to the fourth day after the state visit end date were selected and coded into this time period's database and considered part of the analysis. The reason for choosing "four days ahead or later" was that media usually pay attention to Chinese-related news before and after the visits. The magazine articles were selected based on the "topic-related" and "two issues" basis since they have weekly publishing dates. Any articles mentioning the state visits within the two issues that have the publishing date nearest the state visit dates were selected and coded.

Table 1 shows that Wan's visit articles were selected in a different way from the other seven state visits. The 1989 Wan Li visit lasted for only two days from May 22 to May 24 due to the Tiananmen Issue. Wan Li came to the United States trying to smooth and explain the political situation to the United States but since everything seemed consistently out of control in China, he left quickly after only two days in the United States. Since his visiting time span was short, this study does not include "four days ahead or later" of this specific

visit, but only “one day ahead or later” which made the coding day start from May 21 to May 24. Another consideration is that the media covered Beijing’s situation intensively before the Tiananmen Square Incident finally took place. Within only four days from May 21 to May 24, there were already 73 articles and 74 photos published in the four publications. Since only a very small portion of reports were about Wan Li’s actual visit and the rest of the reports were enough to provide an insightful analysis about the siege in China, we chose reports from May 21 to May 24 to analyze.

**Table 1: Year, dates and coding dates of eight Chinese leaders’ visits**

| Year | Leader       | Dates of the state visit | Dates of report coded |
|------|--------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1979 | DengXiaoping | 01/28/1979-02/04/1979    | 01/24/1979-02/08/1979 |
| 1984 | Zhao Ziyang  | 01/10/1984—01/12/1984    | 01/06/1984—01/16/1984 |
| 1985 | Li Xiannian  | 07/21/1985—07/31/1985    | 07/17/1985—08/04/1985 |
| 1989 | Wan Li       | 05/22/1989—05/23/1989    | 05/21/1989—05/24/1989 |
| 1997 | Jiang Zemin  | 10/27/1997-11/03/1997    | 10/23/1997-11/07/1997 |
| 1999 | Zhu Rongji   | 04/06/1999-04/14/1999    | 04/02/1999-04/18/1999 |
| 2003 | Wen Jiabao   | 12/07/2003-12/10/2003    | 12/03/2003-12/14/2003 |
| 2006 | Hu Jintao    | 04/18/2006-04/21/2006    | 04/14/2006-04/25/2006 |

### **Number of words in an article**

Number of words includes words in headlines and body text in every single report. For each state visit, the average and total number of words in four publications were calculated. Comparisons between the total number of words showed differences in the visits’ importance.

### **Placement on the page**

Placement on the page refers to the location of the textual reports in newspapers and magazines. For newspapers, front page is the first page and the interior page is the rest of the pages except the front page. Newspaper front page news is always the most important.

However, in magazines, the news on the first page does not necessarily mean that it is the most important news of this issue. In magazines, the “feature story” was coded as “front page” placement. If the Chinese leader visit news was the featured story in the magazine, it would be coded in the “front page” category.

### **Sources**

The varieties of sources in text reports were an important indicator for China-U.S. relations. It was expected that there would be more news sources from the largest Chinese news agency—Xinhua News Agency—when the China-U.S. relations were good and fewer sources from Xinhua News Agency when the relations were bad. Sources included the three largest news agencies from the United States, United Kingdom and China: Associated Press, Reuters, and Xinhua News Agency. Also included were Newspaper Staff Written, Special to the Times (The New York Times’ contract writers and stringers), UPI, Others, and none-listed.

Sources play an important role in framing the news. By using quotations from certain people or media, reporters can frame the reports. A pre-coding test of 200 text reports showed that 12 kinds of people and media were the most frequently quoted: Chinese government official, U.S. government official, Chinese economist, U.S. economist, Chinese diplomat, U.S. diplomat, Chinese public, U.S. public, Chinese business representative, U.S. business representative, Chinese media, U.S. media.

### **Dominant frames**

The dominant frame refers to the overall theme in the entire report. Compared to other frames identified in a single text or photo report, the dominant frame should be the most apparent, salient theme. From the headline and text, the readers must get “a clear sense of

what is new or interesting about the material” (Kessler and McDonald, 2000, p.53). The frames emphasized in the headline and the lead paragraph will be the dominant frame. The dominant text frame refers to the aspects that are discussed the most, shown the most, or discussed the longest.

A pre-coding test showed that there were 12 most salient dominant frames in the reports: Economics and trade, Taiwan, communism and ideology, political relation, culture and history, leadership personality, military power and strategy, China borders and neighbors, 911, human rights, censorship, and China-U.S.-Soviet relations.

### **Total frames**

There is only one dominant frame selected for each text report. However, compared to the dominant frames that indicate the most important theme during a state visit, the total frames aimed at finding all major themes occurring and what themes were generally talked about during the state visits. In a state visit, many topics were discussed between leaders, the public, and reporters, and oftentimes many topics were related to each other. For example, if a text report was about leaders from both China and the United States participating in a press conference and making a general announcement to explain the two countries’ relations, the Taiwan issue might also be mentioned at the end of the announcement. In this case the dominant frame will be the “political relations,” but both “Political relations” and “Taiwan” are coded as two total frames in this report.

**Economics and trade.** This frame portrays the China-U.S. economic relationship, such as major economic or trade treaty signing, China entering the WTO and negotiating with the U.S. representatives, and the trade deficit between the United States and China. This included hot topics related to China’s economic development and its benefits/threats to the United

States, such as the reform and opening policy in 1979, China's economic rise at the beginning of 2000, and Chinese people's developing lives with better economic conditions. Economic power is an important index for any country, especially for big countries in the 21st century. A national power competition includes many aspects, among which economic power is one of the most important. From 1979 to the present, after China began its reform and opening policy, it experienced fast economic growth and its economic strength greatly shaped the ever-changing China-U.S. relations.

**Political relations.** Political relations is the frame that portrays the general political strategies, principles and situations of the China-U.S. relationship discussed in media reports during the state visits. China-U.S. relations involve many aspects. During a formal summit like state visits, reporters cover the leaders' announcements, which generally focused on overall relations. Inside the announcements there are often different sections related to certain areas of bilateral relations, such as Taiwan or military issues. These kinds of reports are coded as political relations, not economic relations, Taiwan or ideology.

**Taiwan Issue.** The Taiwan frame illustrates the Taiwan issue's impact on the China-U.S. relationship. The Taiwan issue is still an unsolved historical problem, and due to its importance for sovereign rights and military considerations, it was never neglected during the Chinese leaders' visits. China and the United States would always repeat the "One China" principle, but the real intention and period strategy from the U.S. side would be shown in the media coverage. Both China and the U.S. strategies in Taiwan were always to protect their own benefits first without damaging the "One China" principle. Taiwan frames include leaders' announcements about Taiwan policies, arguments, polls, security and future strategies.



**Communism and Ideology.** This includes broad and general statements about China's social system as the "red," "communist," and "socialist" China.

**Human rights.** The "Human rights" frame does not equal the "ideological frame" because "ideological frame" refers to U.S. media's direct mentioning of China's socialism and communism. "Human rights" refers to specific and practical issues such as the Tiananmen Square Incident, Tibet problem and Falun Gong Issue. The "human rights" frame was originated and constructed under the broad "ideological" differences between China and the United States. The study separated the two frames because "ideological" sounds too dogmatic and human rights issues like the Tiananmen Square Incident, Tibet problem and Falun Gong Issue would be more salient.

**Culture and history.** Culture is the frame that portrays Chinese, U.S. or China-U.S. culture exchange, the cultural differences between two countries and certain types of cultural events during state visits. History refers to historical experience, statement or changes.

**Leadership.** The leadership frame portrays the Chinese leader's personality, characteristics, charisma and his own way of carrying out national political policies. In each state visit, every one of them came for a different purpose. A leader represents a nation's image. A leader with a charming personality can more easily draw a reporter's attention and might result in more positive news. Deng Xiaoping and Zhu Rongji, who were both considered with their own specific characteristics, had the "leadership" frame among the top four of all the frames constructed during their visits.

**Military.** This frame is easy to identify. All reports related to China's application of arms, its military situation and power, its army practices and military actions were coded as having military frames. During Li Xiannian and Zhao Ziyang's visits, nuclear trade was

important, and although it related to military weapons, it was coded as “economics and trade” due to the fact that the focal point was trade rather than the weapon itself.

**China borders and neighbors.** The frame included articles that portray the relationship between China and its neighboring countries and how it influences the China-U.S. power balance and relationship.

**911.** Reporters covered 911 and its potential effects on China-U.S. relations. This frame was selected based on my conversation with Mr. Xuan Meng, famous editor and political critic from *The World Journal*, largest Chinese newspaper in North America. He told me 911 was recognized as a very important milestone in China-U.S. relations because China offered strong public support for the war on terrorism. In the United States, the terrorist attacks greatly changed the nature of discourse. It was no longer plausible to argue that China was the primary security threat to the United States, and the need to focus on the Middle East and the War on Terror made it a priority for the United States to avoid potential distractions in East Asia. However, in this study, no report had a dominant frame of “911”, probably because the nearest state visit in 2003 took place two years after 911 happened, and by that time the subject was not prominent.

**Censorship-**This included articles that talk about press freedom.

**China-U.S.-Soviet relationship.** This includes frames that talk about the triangular relationship between these three countries before the Soviet Union collapsed. Examples included the latest Chinese relations with the Soviet Union and how the Soviet Union reacted to the Chinese leaders’ U.S. visits.

### **Overall tone**

Overall tone refers to the general holistic flavor of each report. The overall tone of the

story consisted of coders answering the question: “How would you classify the overall tone that ran through the piece--positive, negative, or neutral/balanced towards the Chinese leaders?”

This study used a 3-point-scale, including positive, neutral and negative to code for the overall tone content.

A positive story was operationally defined as an overall tone or prevailing elements in the story that suggest political, social and economic stability/strength, progress and improvement, which tend to contribute to a favorable image of a Chinese leader /China. This could include praise for the positive behavior of Chinese leaders in a state, constructive talks with American leaders, improvements in China-U.S. relations or a more reliable, strong and new China.

A negative story was operationally defined as the overall tone or prevailing elements in the story that suggest political, social and economic instability/weakness, conflicts in human rights, or attacks on the Chinese government or a leader’s performance, which tend to contribute to an unfavorable image of a Chinese leader/China.

The third type is the neutral story. This was operationally defined as an overall tone or prevailing elements in the story that show a balance of negative or positive elements. This includes reports that didn’t evaluate a government or a leader’s performance and only described facts.

In the coding book, 1 equals positive, 2 equals neutral and 3 equals negative. 1-1.66 can be regarded as positive, 1.67-2.33 can be regarded as neutral and 2.34-3 can be regarded as negative. Three methods were applied to finalize the overall tone: observing the title, observing the words within the text and observing the quotations in the text.

### **Tones of specific story elements**

Sometimes the tone of a story is not completely positive, negative or neutral. Reporters tend to report both positive and negative aspects of events in a single story. If a story contained at least one positive tone, this was coded. An occurrence of a negative tone was also coded.

### **Quantitative analysis of photos**

#### **Number of photos**

Photos published in the newspapers “four days ahead or later” than the actual visiting dates were chosen. Any photos mentioning the state visits within the two issues that have the publishing date nearest the state visit dates were selected and coded.

#### **Size of photos**

The sizes of the photos were measured by calculating columns they occupied within a newspaper or magazine pages.

#### **Placement on the page**

Placement on the page refers to the location of photos related to state visits on newspapers and magazines. The criteria in defining “cover page” was the same for photos as the textual reports.

#### **Types of people portrayed**

The “focused people” part was analyzing who would be the main focus group during the Chinese leaders’ visit. Seven kinds of people were identified, including: top officials from both sides, Chinese officials only, U.S. officials only, American people and Chinese leaders, Chinese people in China, Chinese leaders and leaders from other countries. By analyzing the “focused people” we can find out who played important role in these visits, what kinds of

people would be influenced during these visits and who would be connected with the visits.

### **Dominant photo frames**

According to Lester (1995) and Meggs (1989), the dominant or focal point in an image is what draws a viewer's eye to the image first. The largest subject in the photo, the focus point or center point, and the distance from the camera will be several important criteria. In this study, the dominant frame of the photo was selected based on what the focus point was or what the largest subjects were doing. The dominant photo frame refers to the aspects that are the largest, in sharpest focus, closest to the camera and in color. Six frames were identified in a pre-coding process, including: people attending cultural program, people attending official functions and programs, leader's head portrait, Chinese people's life (either in China or in the United States), greeting Chinese leaders and people demonstrating or protesting.

The photos were classified into the following categories: (1) People attending a cultural program: this would include Chinese leaders and U.S. leaders placing a wreath at memorials during a ceremony, visiting the graves of former U.S. Presidents, attending welcome dinner or a rodeo; (2) People attending an official function program. This includes the president walking off the plane, walking towards an official welcoming ceremony, attending a news conference, signing an agreement, or visiting the State Department. (3) Leaders' head portrait: this includes mug shots or tightly focused photos of only the head of the leader. (4) Chinese people's lives: this frame includes photos that focus on Chinese people and present their lives through the photo, such as Chinese sellers in a fish market, Chinese college students learning English. (5) Greeting Chinese leaders: this frame usually contains happy public welcoming visiting Chinese leaders by carrying a welcome banner or waving Chinese flags. (6)

Demonstrating or protesting, The audiences' reaction can indirectly reflect a leader's image from a reporter's camera. From the photos we can see whether the public is friendly or not friendly to the leaders, and whether they support the leaders. These actions can indirectly reflect the popularity of the Chinese leader and China at a particular time period. If the focus of the photo was on the protestor or demonstrator, it was coded as demonstrating or protesting. (7) Others: this includes leaders visiting a business factory, attending a business meeting with industry leaders, etc.

### **Tones**

According to Barthes (1978), a photo can communicate a positive or negative tone either denotatively or annotatively—on its face or by interpreted meaning.

The photo tones were identified by the motion, expression and activity of the figures and the environment surrounding them. A pre-coding test showed that U.S. media like to capture visiting Chinese leaders' characteristics and personalities to see if these can represent the larger Chinese national image in a certain period of time. Results showed that media recognized leaders with approachable humanity, versatility, and democratic spirit, and captured interesting moments in the photos. Meanwhile, media provided texts to interpret the leader's political philosophy and role of the government. From the pose of the Chinese leaders, we can interpret whether they are approachable or not. When Deng Xiaoping wore a cowboy hat, when he touched an American child's head, and when Jiang Zeming played the flute, a message of human warmth was communicated. A friendly audience was also coded positively. These actions can indirectly reflect the popularity of the Chinese leader and China at a particular time period. Each photo was coded positive, neutral, or negative in tone. Photos that only contained leaders' heads portraits or leaders with no visible emotions were

coded as neutral.

Another big part of the photos consisted of two leaders from both sides, reflecting and reacting to each other, with face motion and expression. The gesture of the leaders can be used to identify the tones.

Showing the audiences' reaction can also indirectly reflect a leader's image from a reporter's camera. From the photos we can see whether the public is friendly or not friendly to the leaders, and whether they support the leaders. These actions can indirectly reflect the popularity of the Chinese leader and China at a particular time period. Good reactions were coded as positive photos, too. Any photos containing information opposite from the above would be coded as negative. Photos that only contained leaders' heads portraits and those in which the leaders only had mild facial expressions motion without appearing happy or sad would be coded as a neutral.

### **Qualitative analysis of texts and photos**

To answer research question 3: (Were the media frames in the text and photo reports of the Chinese leaders' state visits constructed in terms of the political and economic themes that predominated in each time period?) Qualitative analysis of texts and photos was performed.

#### **Affairs of great importance**

Qualitative analysis began with consideration of the underlying political and economic events surrounding each visit. Frames and tone could then be compared with these underlying events to see how they shaped media reports.

After all comparisons were made for each visit, several text and photo examples from each state visit were analyzed to give a more salient and in-depth understanding of the

China-U.S. relations in certain periods of time.

### **Comparisons by publications**

To answer research question 4: (Do the media differ in covering the state visits?) four publications: *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Time* and *Newsweek* were compared in terms of text/photo frequencies, number of words/column number of photos, news sources, section placements, dominant text/photo frames, overall tones.

### **Inter-coder reliability**

Two Chinese graduate students who were fluent in both Chinese and English were trained about the coding rules and definitions of the categories in the codebook. One of them has been to the United States for three years and the other one for two years. Due to the culture and nationality differences with Native Americans, there might be a difference when Chinese students code the photos. However, due to the limited resources this study used only Chinese students. The inter-coder reliability was tested using the Holsti method (Wimmer & Dominick, 2006). This formula for determining the reliability of nominal data will be calculated in terms of percentage of agreement. A total of 10% of the stories were coded by the two coders. Intercoder reliability was computed using the Holsti (1969) reliability formula:  $CR=2(M)/(N1+N2)$ . Where M is the number of times the coders agree, N1 and N2 are the total numbers of coding decisions made by each other. A 95% reliability result was achieved prior to conducting the analysis.

Differences in coding results occurred the most when two coders coded nuclear trade. One coder tended to code it into the “economics and trade” category while the other tended to code it into the “military” category. Another difference of opinion occurred when coding news related to the Soviet Union. One tended to code it into “China borders and neighbors”



while the other tended to code it into “China-U.S.-Soviet relations.” It was decided that nuclear trade would be coded into the “economics and trade” category and Soviet Union news about its relations with China would be coded into “China borders” if the reports mentioned how the Soviet Union impacted the bilateral relations between China and the United States, it would be coded into “China-U.S.-Soviet relations.”

### **Methods of analysis**

Microsoft Excel and SPSS software were used to conduct the statistical analysis for this study. Excel files displayed descriptive statistics, frequencies and comparisons. The SPSS software was used to analyze the significance of frames, tones and sources.

## CHAPTER 4

### RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This study aims to determine how newspapers and magazines from the United States framed the Chinese leaders' visits. The analysis was completed using both quantitative and qualitative methods. This chapter includes three parts. Each of them answers a research question: (1) To answer research question 1, the number of text/photo reports, number of words and number of columns of the photos, and text/photo page placements were analyzed. (2) To answer research question 2, text frames and dominant frames, photo people categories and frames, news sources of texts, news sources of the photos, and tones of text and photos were analyzed. The differences between texts and photos were also noted. (3) To answer research question 3, a case-by-case analysis of each state visit was conducted to see if the themes in the media matched underlying political economic themes chosen from the affairs of great importance. The differences between texts and photos were also analyzed. (4) To answer research question 4, the two newspapers and two magazines were compared in terms of coverage intensity, frames, tones and sources.

#### Text quantitative study

Table 2: Comparison of text frequencies, mean and total number of words by visits

| Year  | Leader       | Frequency | Mean     | Percent | Total number of words |
|-------|--------------|-----------|----------|---------|-----------------------|
| 1979  | DengXiaoping | 127       | 948.92   | 27.1%   | 120512                |
| 1984  | Zhao Ziyang  | 40        | 729.60   | 8.5%    | 29184                 |
| 1985  | Li Xiannian  | 24        | 609.83   | 5.1%    | 14636                 |
| 1989  | Wan Li       | 73        | 1,035.85 | 15.6%   | 75617                 |
| 1997  | Jiang Zemin  | 90        | 1,058.98 | 19.2%   | 95308                 |
| 1999  | Zhu Rongji   | 53        | 953.85   | 11.3%   | 50554                 |
| 2003  | Wen Jiabao   | 28        | 1,010.64 | 6.0%    | 28298                 |
| 2006  | Hu Jintao    | 34        | 899.12   | 7.2%    | 30570                 |
| Total |              | 469       | 948.14   | 100.0%  | 444678                |

Table 2 shows the total of 469 articles, the first state visit paid by Deng Xiaoping, the

fourth state visit paid by Wan Li, and the fifth state visit paid by Jiang Zemin resulted in more articles. The Deng visit contained 127 articles (27.1%), the Jiang visit contained 90 articles (19.2%), and the Wan visit contained 73 articles (15.6%).

By multiplying the number of articles by average length, one can calculate the overall total of words published. Results show Deng's visit had the most words, followed by Jiang's 1997 visit and then Wan's 1989 visit. The lack of evenness of coverage suggests state visits do not automatically generate a set amount of coverage in the U.S. media. While one might expect that the first visit would generate more coverage than subsequent visits the pattern shows that other factors must be involved. One possible factor relates to the political and economic situation at the time of each visit.

Deng's 1979 visit was the first Chinese leader's state visit after the formal establishment of China-U.S. foreign diplomatic ties. Wan's 1989 visit took place right before the Tiananmen Square Incident, and Jiang Zemin's 1997 visit was the first visit after China and the United States experienced a frigid period of relations due to the Tiananmen Square Incident and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Those three visits all had comparatively higher importance and they were the start of the "Green," "Dark" and "Grey" China periods.

Table 3 shows an obvious trend of the text section placement: the text reports in the first five visits have more front page placements. Deng's 1979 visit, Zhao's 1984 visit, Li's 1985 visit, Wan's 1989 visit and Jiang's 1997 visit had 20% or more text placement on the front page, while the remaining the three visits have less than 20%. Three out of the top five visits-- Deng's 1979 visit, Zhao's 1984 visit, and Wan's 1989 visit all have over 30% placement on the front page. Based on the observation of the eight visits, the first three visiting leaders came for the general establishment and strengthening of China-U.S. relations.

These general discussions were continued in leaders' formal statements so they were more often placed on the front page. In addition, reporters were curious about the newly-opened country from the Far East that has different social institutions and a different ideology. Wan's 1989 visit happened during the Tiananmen Square Incident, a huge social crisis that was important international news. This explains its appearance more frequently on page 1. The last three visits focused on economic relations and many reports were placed in "Business" or "Review" sections.

**Table 3: Comparison of text report front/interior page locations by visits**

| Year  | Leader        | Section    |               | Total   |
|-------|---------------|------------|---------------|---------|
|       |               | Front Page | Interior Page |         |
| 1979  | Deng Xiaoping | 44         | 83            | 127     |
|       |               | 34.60%     | 65.40%        | 100.00% |
| 1984  | Zhao Ziyang   | 8          | 32            | 40      |
|       |               | 20.00%     | 80.00%        | 100.00% |
| 1985  | Li Xiannian   | 8          | 16            | 24      |
|       |               | 33.30%     | 66.70%        | 100.00% |
| 1989  | Wan Li        | 29         | 44            | 73      |
|       |               | 39.70%     | 60.30%        | 100.00% |
| 1997  | Jiang Zemin   | 25         | 65            | 90      |
|       |               | 27.80%     | 72.20%        | 100.00% |
| 1999  | Zhu Rongji    | 10         | 43            | 53      |
|       |               | 18.90%     | 81.10%        | 100.00% |
| 2003  | Wen Jiabao    | 4          | 24            | 28      |
|       |               | 14.30%     | 85.70%        | 100.00% |
| 2006  | Hu Jintao     | 6          | 28            | 34      |
|       |               | 17.60%     | 82.40%        | 100.00% |
| Total |               | 134        | 335           | 469     |
|       |               | 28.60%     | 71.40%        | 100.00% |

Results from Table 4 show newspaper and magazine staffs are the most common sources of reports for the Chinese leaders' visits. Special to the Times is the report written by *the New York Times*' contract writers and stringers. We can see a total of 87.9% (69.3%+18.6%) of the reports were written by staff. Only 1.7% of the text reports came from

news agencies.

Table 4: Comparison of news sources by visits

| Year  | Leader        | Source           |         |                         |                      |       |                    | Total   |
|-------|---------------|------------------|---------|-------------------------|----------------------|-------|--------------------|---------|
|       |               | Associated Press | Reuters | Newspaper Staff Written | Special to the Times | UPI   | Others, non-listed |         |
| 1979  | Deng Xiaoping | 3                | 0       | 58                      | 52                   | 1     | 13                 | 127     |
|       |               | 2.40%            | 0.00%   | 45.70%                  | 40.90%               | 0.80% | 10.20%             | 100.00% |
| 1984  | Zhao Ziyang   | 0                | 1       | 34                      | 1                    | 1     | 3                  | 40      |
|       |               | 0.00%            | 2.50%   | 85.00%                  | 2.50%                | 2.50% | 7.50%              | 100.00% |
| 1985  | Li Xiannian   | 0                | 1       | 16                      | 6                    | 0     | 1                  | 24      |
|       |               | 0.00%            | 4.20%   | 66.70%                  | 25.00%               | 0.00% | 4.20%              | 100.00% |
| 1989  | Wan Li        | 1                | 0       | 36                      | 23                   | 0     | 13                 | 73      |
|       |               | 1.40%            | 0.00%   | 49.30%                  | 31.50%               | 0.00% | 17.80%             | 100.00% |
| 1997  | Jiang Zemin   | 2                | 0       | 80                      | 3                    | 0     | 5                  | 90      |
|       |               | 2.20%            | 0.00%   | 88.90%                  | 3.30%                | 0.00% | 5.60%              | 100.00% |
| 1999  | Zhu Rongji    | 0                | 0       | 46                      | 1                    | 0     | 6                  | 53      |
|       |               | 0.00%            | 0.00%   | 86.80%                  | 1.90%                | 0.00% | 11.30%             | 100.00% |
| 2003  | Wen Jiabao    | 0                | 0       | 24                      | 0                    | 0     | 4                  | 28      |
|       |               | 0.00%            | 0.00%   | 85.70%                  | 0.00%                | 0.00% | 14.30%             | 100.00% |
| 2006  | Hu Jintao     | 0                | 0       | 31                      | 1                    | 0     | 2                  | 34      |
|       |               | 0.00%            | 0.00%   | 91.20%                  | 2.90%                | 0.00% | 5.90%              | 100.00% |
| Total |               | 6                | 2       | 325                     | 87                   | 2     | 47                 | 469     |
|       |               | 1.30%            | 0.40%   | 69.30%                  | 18.60%               | 0.40% | 10.00%             | 100.00% |

Table 5 shows six major sources were used in reports for the Chinese leaders' State visits. Government officials (71.8%), public (10.9%), business leaders (7.1%), media (6.4%), economists (1.9%) and diplomats (1.2%). The most frequently appearing quotation sources are Chinese (36.2%) and U.S. officials (35.6%) because they are the authorities who gave public announcements during the visits. The next most frequent quotation sources is from the public, because the public is present, reacting to the state visits.

The U.S. media use frames to shape Chinese leaders and China's profiles during different visits.

Table 5: Comparison of text quotations by visits


| Year  | Leader           | ChineseGovt<br>Official | USGovt<br>Official | Chinese<br>Economist | US<br>Economist | Chinese<br>Diplomat | US<br>Diplomat | Chinese<br>Public | US Public | Chinese<br>Business | US<br>Business | Chinese<br>Media | US Media |
|-------|------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------|---------------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------|---------------------|----------------|------------------|----------|
| 1979  | Deng<br>Xiaoping | 50                      | 58                 | 1                    | 0               | 1                   | 1              | 4                 | 7         | 0                   | 5              | 12               | 1        |
|       |                  | 39.40%                  | 45.70%             | 0.80%                | 0.00%           | 0.80%               | 0.80%          | 3.10%             | 5.50%     | 0.00%               | 3.90%          | 9.40%            | 0.80%    |
| 1984  | Zhao<br>Ziyang   | 18                      | 11                 | 0                    | 0               | 1                   | 0              | 0                 | 0         | 0                   | 0              | 3                | 1        |
|       |                  | 45.00%                  | 27.50%             | 0.00%                | 0.00%           | 2.50%               | 0.00%          | 0.00%             | 0.00%     | 0.00%               | 0.00%          | 7.50%            | 2.50%    |
| 1985  | Li<br>Xiannian   | 12                      | 8                  | 0                    | 1               | 0                   | 0              | 0                 | 0         | 0                   | 0              | 1                | 0        |
|       |                  | 50.00%                  | 33.30%             | 0.00%                | 4.20%           | 0.00%               | 0.00%          | 0.00%             | 0.00%     | 0.00%               | 0.00%          | 4.20%            | 0.00%    |
| 1989  | Wan Li           | 14                      | 10                 | 1                    | 1               | 0                   | 1              | 22                | 3         | 1                   | 0              | 4                | 1        |
|       |                  | 19.20%                  | 13.70%             | 1.40%                | 1.40%           | 0.00%               | 1.40%          | 30.10%            | 4.10%     | 1.40%               | 0.00%          | 5.50%            | 1.40%    |
| 1997  | Jiang<br>Zemin   | 33                      | 38                 | 0                    | 1               | 0                   | 1              | 2                 | 7         | 0                   | 9              | 4                | 1        |
|       |                  | 36.70%                  | 42.20%             | 0.00%                | 1.10%           | 0.00%               | 1.10%          | 2.20%             | 7.80%     | 0.00%               | 10.00%         | 4.40%            | 1.10%    |
| 1999  | Zhu<br>Rongji    | 20                      | 17                 | 0                    | 1               | 0                   | 0              | 3                 | 2         | 1                   | 5              | 0                | 1        |
|       |                  | 37.70%                  | 32.10%             | 0.00%                | 1.90%           | 0.00%               | 0.00%          | 5.70%             | 3.80%     | 1.90%               | 9.40%          | 0.00%            | 1.90%    |
| 2003  | Wen<br>Jiabao    | 12                      | 10                 | 0                    | 1               | 0                   | 0              | 0                 | 0         | 1                   | 3              | 0                | 0        |
|       |                  | 42.90%                  | 35.70%             | 0.00%                | 3.60%           | 0.00%               | 0.00%          | 0.00%             | 0.00%     | 3.60%               | 10.70%         | 0.00%            | 0.00%    |
| 2006  | Hu<br>Jintao     | 11                      | 15                 | 1                    | 1               | 1                   | 0              | 1                 | 0         | 2                   | 6              | 1                | 0        |
|       |                  | 32.40%                  | 44.10%             | 2.90%                | 2.90%           | 2.90%               | 0.00%          | 2.90%             | 0.00%     | 5.90%               | 17.60%         | 2.90%            | 0.00%    |
| Total |                  | 170                     | 167                | 3                    | 6               | 3                   | 3              | 32                | 19        | 5                   | 28             | 25               | 5        |
|       |                  | 36.20%                  | 35.60%             | 0.60%                | 1.30%           | 0.60%               | 0.60%          | 6.80%             | 4.10%     | 1.10%               | 6.00%          | 5.30%            | 1.10%    |

Table 6: Comparison of dominant frames by visits

| Year  | Leader        | Economics and trade | Taiwan | Communism and ideology | Political relations | Culture and history | Leadership personality | Military | China borders and neighbors | Human rights | Censorship | China-U.S.-Soviet relationship | Others |
|-------|---------------|---------------------|--------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------|----------|-----------------------------|--------------|------------|--------------------------------|--------|
| 1979  | Deng Xiaoping | 13                  | 15     | 2                      | 24                  | 7                   | 12                     | 1        | 9                           | 0            | 0          | 12                             | 32     |
|       |               | 10.20%              | 11.80% | 1.60%                  | 18.90%              | 5.50%               | 9.40%                  | 0.80%    | 7.10%                       | 0.00%        | 0.00%      | 9.40%                          | 25.20% |
| 1984  | Zhao Ziyang   | 9                   | 5      | 0                      | 10                  | 1                   | 3                      | 1        | 2                           | 0            | 0          | 0                              | 9      |
|       |               | 22.50%              | 12.50% | 0.00%                  | 25.00%              | 2.50%               | 7.50%                  | 2.50%    | 5.00%                       | 0.00%        | 0.00%      | 0.00%                          | 22.50% |
| 1985  | Li Xiannian   | 9                   | 1      | 0                      | 1                   | 1                   | 3                      | 1        | 0                           | 0            | 0          | 0                              | 8      |
|       |               | 37.50%              | 4.20%  | 0.00%                  | 4.20%               | 4.20%               | 12.50%                 | 4.20%    | 0.00%                       | 0.00%        | 0.00%      | 0.00%                          | 33.30% |
| 1989  | Wan Li        | 9                   | 0      | 5                      | 2                   | 1                   | 7                      | 10       | 2                           | 31           | 0          | 3                              | 3      |
|       |               | 12.30%              | 0.00%  | 6.80%                  | 2.70%               | 1.40%               | 9.60%                  | 13.70%   | 2.70%                       | 42.50%       | 0.00%      | 4.10%                          | 4.10%  |
| 1997  | Jiang Zemin   | 13                  | 1      | 0                      | 19                  | 0                   | 10                     | 1        | 1                           | 29           | 1          | 0                              | 15     |
|       |               | 14.40%              | 1.10%  | 0.00%                  | 21.10%              | 0.00%               | 11.10%                 | 1.10%    | 1.10%                       | 32.20%       | 1.10%      | 0.00%                          | 16.70% |
| 1999  | Zhu Rongji    | 26                  | 1      | 1                      | 4                   | 1                   | 9                      | 6        | 0                           | 4            | 0          | 1                              | 0      |
|       |               | 49.10%              | 1.90%  | 1.90%                  | 7.50%               | 1.90%               | 17.00%                 | 11.30%   | 0.00%                       | 7.50%        | 0.00%      | 1.90%                          | 0.00%  |
| 2003  | Wen Jiabao    | 12                  | 11     | 0                      | 0                   | 1                   | 1                      | 0        | 1                           | 0            | 0          | 0                              | 2      |
|       |               | 42.90%              | 39.30% | 0.00%                  | 0.00%               | 3.60%               | 3.60%                  | 0.00%    | 3.60%                       | 0.00%        | 0.00%      | 0.00%                          | 7.10%  |
| 2006  | Hu Jintao     | 11                  | 1      | 0                      | 8                   | 0                   | 0                      | 1        | 1                           | 3            | 1          | 0                              | 8      |
|       |               | 32.40%              | 2.90%  | 0.00%                  | 23.50%              | 0.00%               | 0.00%                  | 2.90%    | 2.90%                       | 8.80%        | 2.90%      | 0.00%                          | 23.50% |
| Total |               | 102                 | 35     | 8                      | 68                  | 12                  | 45                     | 21       | 16                          | 67           | 2          | 16                             | 77     |
|       |               | 21.70%              | 7.50%  | 1.70%                  | 14.50%              | 2.60%               | 9.60%                  | 4.50%    | 3.40%                       | 14.30%       | 0.40%      | 3.40%                          | 16.40% |

According to Table 6, a variety of dominant frames were used, a total of 11 frames, including economics and trade, political relations, leadership personality, etc.. Table 6 shows that the number of reports for each category varies considerably. The most frequent frame is “Economics and trade” with 102 articles (21.7%). The second most frequent frame is the “political relation” one with 68 articles (14.5%), followed by “human rights,” “leadership personality,” “Taiwan,” “military,” “Chinese borders and neighbors,” “China-U.S.-Soviet relationship,” “culture and history,” “communism and ideology,” and “censorship.” The pie chart below shows the percentages.

Figure 1: Percentage chart for dominant frames in text reports





**Economics and trade.** Among the eight visits, there are four visits that have “economics and trade” as the dominant frame. They are the 1985 Li Xiannian visit, the 1999 Zhu Rongji visit, the 2003 Wen Jiaobao visit and the 2006 Hu Jintao visit. Economics and trade was always one of the top three dominant frames for all eight visits. The reason this frame is so important might be due to China’s reform and opening policy in 1978. This change brought both countries lots of opportunities. For example, in Li Xiannian’s 1985 visit, economic cooperation was the most sensitive area--the nuclear trade treaty was signed. But the 1989 Tiananmen Issue hurt the relationship badly, which led to “human rights” as the dominant frame for Jiang’s 1997 visit with “economics and trade” ranked third. After 1997, China’s economic strength was greatly developed as shown by its firm performance in the 1997 Asia financial crisis, and debut in the WTO after 1999. With the “peaceful rise” in 2001 these developments showed the world China’s importance in the economic world and more importantly, a tight trade relationship between China and the United States. During Wen’s 2003 visit, China’s peaceful rise was the hottest topic and in Hu’s 2006 visit, the China-U.S. trade deficit was widely discussed.

**Political relations.** The political relations frame occurred most frequently during Deng’s 1997 visit and Zhao’s 1984 visit, and ranked second in frequency for Jiang’s 1997 visit and Hu’s 2006 visit. After January 1, 1979, the two countries signed the Shanghai Joint Communiqué and started formal diplomatic relations. During the first two visits political relations was a new topic and the U.S. media were interested in covering more aspects of this political relationship, especially when the Soviet Union’s relationship was sensitive to both of the countries. During Jiang’s 1997 visit, this frame focused on restoring political relations

after the Tiananmen Issue and Taiwan Strait Crisis. During Hu's 2006 visit, the two leaders, Hu and Bush were anxious to avoid letting their disputes seriously damage ties since the two countries actually had many conflicts in trade, military, and other aspects like the Falun Gong.

**Taiwan Issue.** The Taiwan frame was the second most dominant frame in Deng's 1979 visit and Wen's 2003 visit. It was expected that during Jiang's 1997 visit, which was right after the 1995-96 "Taiwan Strait Crisis," more "Taiwan" frame would be found; however, there was only one article. During Deng's 1979 visit, Taiwan was the most important obstacle for opening a healthy bilateral political relationship. Media made a considerable effort to portray the U.S. main point: there is only one China but the United States still has the power to intervene between China and Taiwan. Media thus built a frame in which the United States was the world superpower while respecting each country's rights. Right before Wen's 2003 visit, Taiwan's President Chen Shuibian was trying to hold a Taiwan referendum in 2004, and even though Bush issued a warning to Taiwan, Chen still wanted to proceed. Actually the main purpose of Wen's visit was to discuss the Taiwan referendum with the Bush administration, so that's why the Taiwan frame was at the top of the list.

**Communism and Ideology.** This dominant frame only occupied 1.7% of all visits and existed in three visits (Deng, Wan and Zhu). In Deng's 1979 visit, the "communism and ideology" frame focused on positive changes that China's development had brought to a socialist country. At that time, the U.S. media held a negative attitude towards communist/socialist countries simply because the Cold War divided two superpower countries basically on the difference of ideology. However, in 1989, the year in which the Tiananmen Square Issue happened, for Wan's 1989 visit, the focus of the "communism and

ideology” frame switched to government censorship and freedom of speech, which were all coded in the “censorship” frame category.

**Human rights.** Before 1989, human rights discussion about China focused on the changes and improvements in Chinese people’s living conditions. But since those topics always involved improvements in China’s economic condition, they were always coded into “economics and trade” category. In the days before and after the 1989 Tiananmen Issue happened, human rights became an important topic about China. The U.S. media focused considerable attention on this turmoil in China tried their during May 21 to May 24, 1989, to show the possibility that student and citizen protesting can promote democracy in China. However, things were contrary to the U.S. expectation. For eight years after the event, the two countries didn’t pay any state visits to one other. On the one hand, there are also grievances which relate to human rights in China from the United States, and on the other hand, there are suspicions from China that the United States wishes to make China weak and divided and that criticisms pertaining to its human rights record are unwarranted in light of the economic and living standard improvements that have occurred in the country. This frame was the most frequent in media reports during Wan’s 1989 visit and Jiang’s 1997 visit. In Hu’s 2006 visit, a Falun Gong practitioner protested outside the White House when Hu was delivering his speech. This became big news.

**Leadership.** Deng Xiaoping and Zhu Rongji, who were both considered with their own specific characteristics, had the “leadership” frame among the top four of all the frames constructed in their visits.

**Military.** Especially in Wan’s 1989 visit, the military was deadlocked in the Tiananmen Square with the protesting students and citizens, so reporting focused on the use of the

military by the Chinese government.

**911.** In this study, no report had a dominant frame of “911”, probably because the nearest state visit in 2003 took place two years after 911 happened, and by that time the subject was not prominent.

In addition to the dominant frame, all frames found in each report were coded. Results are shown in table 7. Results show that economics and trade continues to be the most frequent for both dominant frame and total frames. However, human rights as a frame occurs in stories more in total frames than dominant. Dominant frame distribution and total frames rankings are compared in Table 8. There were few major differences.

Table 7: Comparison of total frames by visits

| Year  | Leader           | Econ<br>AndTrade | Taiwan | Communism<br>And<br>Ideology | Political<br>Relation | Culture<br>And History | Leadership<br>Personality | Military | China<br>Borders | 911   | Human<br>Rights |
|-------|------------------|------------------|--------|------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|----------|------------------|-------|-----------------|
| 1979  | Deng<br>Xiaoping | 44               | 30     | 18                           | 38                    | 15                     | 22                        | 17       | 30               | 0     | 2               |
|       |                  | 0.346            | 0.236  | 0.142                        | 0.299                 | 0.118                  | 0.173                     | 0.134    | 0.236            | 0     | 0.016           |
| 1984  | Zhao<br>Ziyang   | 15               | 14     | 1                            | 13                    | 1                      | 5                         | 5        | 8                | 0     | 0               |
|       |                  | 0.375            | 0.35   | 0.025                        | 0.325                 | 0.025                  | 0.125                     | 0.125    | 0.2              | 0     | 0               |
| 1985  | Li<br>Xiannian   | 11               | 2      | 0                            | 2                     | 1                      | 4                         | 8        | 1                | 0     | 0               |
|       |                  | 0.458            | 0.083  | 0                            | 0.083                 | 0.042                  | 0.167                     | 0.333    | 0.042            | 0     | 0               |
| 1989  | Wan Li           | 10               | 1      | 13                           | 6                     | 0                      | 18                        | 19       | 6                | 0     | 35              |
|       |                  | 0.137            | 0.014  | 0.178                        | 0.082                 | 0                      | 0.247                     | 0.26     | 0.082            | 0     | 0.479           |
| 1997  | Jiang<br>Zemin   | 42               | 9      | 4                            | 30                    | 3                      | 23                        | 11       | 7                | 0     | 60              |
|       |                  | 0.467            | 0.1    | 0.044                        | 0.333                 | 0.033                  | 0.256                     | 0.122    | 0.078            | 0     | 0.667           |
| 1999  | Zhu<br>Rongji    | 36               | 5      | 2                            | 15                    | 1                      | 17                        | 13       | 0                | 0     | 16              |
|       |                  | 0.679            | 0.094  | 0.038                        | 0.283                 | 0.019                  | 0.321                     | 0.245    | 0                | 0     | 0.302           |
| 2003  | Wen<br>Jiabao    | 15               | 14     | 1                            | 5                     | 1                      | 1                         | 3        | 3                | 0     | 0               |
|       |                  | 0.536            | 0.5    | 0.036                        | 0.179                 | 0.036                  | 0.036                     | 0.107    | 0.107            | 0     | 0               |
| 2006  | Hu Jintao        | 21               | 5      | 1                            | 9                     | 1                      | 2                         | 6        | 4                | 0     | 8               |
|       |                  | 0.618            | 0.147  | 0.029                        | 0.265                 | 0.029                  | 0.059                     | 0.176    | 0.118            | 0     | 0.235           |
| Total |                  | (1)194           | (6)80  | (8)40                        | (3)118                | (9)23                  | (4)92                     | (5)82    | (7)59            | (10)0 | (2)121          |
|       |                  | 0.414            | 0.171  | 0.085                        | 0.252                 | 0.049                  | 0.196                     | 0.175    | 0.126            | 0     | 0.258           |

Table 8: Ranking comparison between dominant and total frames

| Ranking        | 1                   | 2                   | 3                   | 4                      | 5        | 6        | 7                           | 8                              | 9                   | 10                     | 11         | 12  |
|----------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------|----------|----------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|------------|-----|
| Dominant Frame | Economics and trade | Political relations | Human rights        | Leadership personality | Taiwan   | Military | China borders and neighbors | China-U.S.-Soviet relationship | Culture and history | Communism and ideology | Censorship | 911 |
| Total Frame    | Economics and trade | Human rights        | Political relations | Leadership personality | Military | Taiwan   | China borders and neighbors | Communism and ideology         | Culture and history | 911                    |            |     |

Table 9: Comparison of overall tone by visits

| Year  | Leader        | Tone Overall |         |          | Total   | Average | Tone     |
|-------|---------------|--------------|---------|----------|---------|---------|----------|
|       |               | Positive     | Neutral | Negative |         |         |          |
| 1979  | Deng Xiaoping | 77           | 39      | 11       | 127     | 1.48    | positive |
|       |               | 60.60%       | 30.70%  | 8.70%    | 100.00% |         |          |
| 1984  | Zhao Ziyang   | 20           | 16      | 4        | 40      | 1.6     | positive |
|       |               | 50.00%       | 40.00%  | 10.00%   | 100.00% |         |          |
| 1985  | Li Xiannian   | 9            | 12      | 3        | 24      | 1.75    | neutral  |
|       |               | 37.50%       | 50.00%  | 12.50%   | 100.00% |         |          |
| 1989  | Wan Li        | 0            | 10      | 63       | 73      | 2.86    | negative |
|       |               | 0.00%        | 13.70%  | 86.30%   | 100.00% |         |          |
| 1997  | Jiang Zemin   | 31           | 35      | 24       | 90      | 1.92    | neutral  |
|       |               | 34.40%       | 38.90%  | 26.70%   | 100.00% |         |          |
| 1999  | Zhu Rongji    | 22           | 18      | 13       | 53      | 1.83    | neutral  |
|       |               | 41.50%       | 34.00%  | 24.50%   | 100.00% |         |          |
| 2003  | Wen Jiabao    | 8            | 16      | 4        | 28      | 1.86    | neutral  |
|       |               | 28.60%       | 57.10%  | 14.30%   | 100.00% |         |          |
| 2006  | Hu Jintao     | 9            | 11      | 14       | 34      | 2.15    | neutral  |
|       |               | 26.50%       | 32.40%  | 41.20%   | 100.00% |         |          |
| Total |               | 176          | 157     | 136      | 469     | 1.91    | neutral  |
|       |               | 37.50%       | 33.50%  | 29.00%   | 100.00% |         |          |

The overall tone is a very important indicator. In the coding book, 1 equals positive, 2 equals neutral and 3 equals negative. The range from 1-1.66 can be regarded as positive, 1.67-2.33 can be regarded as neutral and 2.34-3 can be regarded as negative. Three methods were applied to finalize the overall tone: observing the title, observing the words within the text and observing the contents in the text.

The mean score and classification as positive, neutral or negative are shown in the final two columns of Table 9. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare mean tone scores for the eight visits. Results in Table 10 show a significant difference.

There are three trends shown in Table 9 about the overall tone in articles about the Chinese leaders' visits. First, most of the state visits didn't have an absolutely dominant tone—all positive, neutral or negative. Second, only Wan's 1989 visit was classified as

negative in overall tone. Third, visits before the 1989 visit were more inclined to have a positive tone, and visits after the 1989 visit were more likely to be classified as neutral.

Visits with the most positive overall tone are: Deng's 1979 visit, Zhao's 1984 visit and Zhu's 1999 visit. The visits with most negative overall tone are: Wan's 1989 visit, Hu's 2006 visit and Jiang's 1997 visit. Visits with the most neutral overall tone are: Wen's 2003 visit, Li's 1985 visit, Hu's 2006 visit and Zhao's 1984 visit.

Table 10: One-way ANOVA,  $F=29.982$ ,  $P<.000$

| Tone Overall   |                |     |             |        |       |
|----------------|----------------|-----|-------------|--------|-------|
|                | Sum of Squares | df  | Mean Square | F      | Sig.  |
| Between Groups | 96.537         | 7   | 13.791      | 29.982 | 0.000 |
| Within Groups  | 212.051        | 461 | 0.460       |        |       |
| Total          | 308.588        | 468 |             |        |       |

A Scheffe test indicated significant differences in tone between individual visits. The overall tone of Deng's 1979 visit is significantly different from Wan's 1989 visit, Jiang's 1997 visit and Hu's 2006 visit. Those three visits were more negative in tone while Deng's 1979 visit is the visit with the most positive tone. Wan's 1989 visit's overall tone is significantly more negative than the rest of the seven because it lacked any articles with an overall positive tone and had the highest percentage of negative tone (86.3%). No other significant differences were found between other visits.

### Overall Positive and Negative Tone Analysis

Results of the analysis of all positive and negative tones in texts are shown in Table 11. Results show that 59.5% of all the reports had at least some positive tone and 53.5% of the reports had at least some negative tone. Compared to the overall negative tone (29.00%), these results show that negative material was present in a majority of articles even through the dominant tone was often positive or neutral. As was the case for the overall tone results,



Deng's visit was the most positive and Wan's visit was the most negative. Although there were no text reports with a dominantly positive tone during Wan's visit due to the Tiananmen Square upheaval period, there still were 21.9% reports having at least some positive tone. This supports the idea that U.S. journalists includes both positive and negative material in an effort to be objective. For example, in "Crowds keep soldiers from Main Square" (*The New York Times*, Sunday, May 21 1989, p.16), the main purpose was to show people power against the government during the upheaval in China, which was negative, but a paragraph describing Mr. Zhao Ziyang's bold proposals for the people was positive.

**Table 11: Comparison of text positive tone and negative tone by visits**

| Year  | Leader        | TonePositive  | ToneNegative  |
|-------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| 1979  | Deng Xiaoping | 91<br>71.70%  | 35<br>27.60%  |
| 1984  | Zhao Ziyang   | 28<br>70.00%  | 10<br>25.00%  |
| 1985  | Li Xiannian   | 12<br>50.00%  | 6<br>25.00%   |
| 1989  | Wan Li        | 16<br>21.90%  | 72<br>98.60%  |
| 1997  | Jiang Zemin   | 59<br>65.60%  | 61<br>67.80%  |
| 1999  | Zhu Rongji    | 38<br>71.70%  | 29<br>54.70%  |
| 2003  | Wen Jiabao    | 16<br>57.10%  | 14<br>50.00%  |
| 2006  | Hu Jintao     | 19<br>55.90%  | 24<br>70.60%  |
| Total |               | 279<br>59.50% | 251<br>53.50% |

## Photo quantitative study

Table 12: Photo Frequencies in different state visits

| Year  | Leader        | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|---------------|-----------|---------|
| 1979  | Deng Xiaoping | 86        | 33.5    |
| 1984  | Zhao Ziyang   | 6         | 2.3     |
| 1985  | Li Xiannian   | 9         | 3.5     |
| 1989  | Wan Li        | 74        | 28.8    |
| 1997  | Jiang Zemin   | 34        | 13.2    |
| 1999  | Zhu Rongji    | 19        | 7.4     |
| 2003  | Wen Jiabao    | 10        | 3.9     |
| 2006  | Hu Jintao     | 19        | 7.4     |
| Total |               | 257       | 100     |

Of the 257 total photos, the first state visit by Deng Xiaoping, the fourth state visit paid Wan Li, and the fifth state visit paid by Jiang Zemin had more photos published (See Table 12). Deng's visit contained 86 photos (33.5%), Wan's visit contained 74 photos (28.8%), and Jiang's visit contained 34 photos (13.2%). These three visits had more text reports too. So the visits that have more text reports tend to have more photos published. Text frequency and photo frequency are interrelated.

When comparing the size of photos in Table 13, no obvious differences were found among the eight visits. The only trend identified among the eight visits is that one and two column-sized photos are the most common, with two-column sized photos most frequent for three visits and one-column sized photos most frequent for two visits. The 1979 and 1989 visits ranked at the top in terms of photos published in the one column size, and 1979, 1989, and 1997 ranked as the top three in photos published in the two-column size.

Table 14 shows the photos from 1979, 1984 and 1989 visits were placed more frequently on the front page. The 44.4% percentage of overall photos on the front page is greater than that of the text stories (28.6%), because magazines published several photos together in a single feature story report.

Table 13: Comparison of photo sizes by visits

| Year  | Leader        | PhotoSize  |            |              |             |                   | Total |
|-------|---------------|------------|------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------|-------|
|       |               | one column | two column | three column | four column | other, non-listed |       |
| 1979  | Deng Xiaoping | 48         | 19         | 16           | 2           | 1                 | 86    |
|       |               | 55.80%     | 22.10%     | 18.60%       | 2.30%       | 1.20%             |       |
| 1984  | Zhao Ziyang   | 3          | 3          | 0            | 0           | 0                 | 6     |
|       |               | 50.00%     | 50.00%     | 0.00%        | 0.00%       | 0.00%             |       |
| 1985  | Li Xiannian   | 1          | 4          | 3            | 1           | 0                 | 9     |
|       |               | 11.10%     | 44.40%     | 33.30%       | 11.10%      | 0.00%             |       |
| 1989  | Wan Li        | 21         | 21         | 20           | 7           | 5                 | 74    |
|       |               | 28.40%     | 28.40%     | 27.00%       | 9.50%       | 6.80%             |       |
| 1997  | Jiang Zemin   | 7          | 15         | 8            | 3           | 1                 | 34    |
|       |               | 20.60%     | 44.10%     | 23.50%       | 8.80%       | 2.90%             |       |
| 1999  | Zhu Rongji    | 8          | 3          | 7            | 1           | 0                 | 19    |
|       |               | 42.10%     | 15.80%     | 36.80%       | 5.30%       | 0.00%             |       |
| 2003  | Wen Jiabao    | 3          | 5          | 2            | 0           | 0                 | 10    |
|       |               | 30.00%     | 50.00%     | 20.00%       | 0.00%       | 0.00%             |       |
| 2006  | Hu Jintao     | 5          | 6          | 2            | 6           | 0                 | 19    |
|       |               | 26.30%     | 31.60%     | 10.50%       | 31.60%      | 0.00%             |       |
| Total |               | 96         | 76         | 58           | 20          | 7                 | 257   |
|       |               | 37.40%     | 29.60%     | 22.60%       | 7.80%       | 2.70%             |       |

After 1997, fewer than 50% of photos were placed on the front page. The reason might be due partially to the fact that the economic frame became dominant after 1997 and lots of reports were placed in the business section rather than on the front page.

According to Table 15, western news agencies were more popular sources than the Chinese Xinhua News Agency because there were only 2 photos that came from it. Some sources (39.3%) could not be determined because the photos were too blurry and the sources were printed on the dark part of the photos and it was too blurry to determine what they were.

Each photo was coded in terms of who was portrayed and results are shown in Table 16. Results show that the people included most frequently are Chinese people in China, followed by top officials from both sides. Next was Chinese officials only. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji are three leaders who got most head portraits.

Table 14: Comparison of photo front/interior page placement by visits

| Year  | Leader    | Section    |               | Total   |
|-------|-----------|------------|---------------|---------|
|       |           | Front Page | Interior Page |         |
| 1979  | Deng      | 49         | 37            | 86      |
|       | Xiaoping  | 57.00%     | 43.00%        | 100.00% |
| 1984  | Zhao      | 4          | 2             | 6       |
|       | Ziyang    | 66.70%     | 33.30%        | 100.00% |
| 1985  | Li        | 4          | 5             | 9       |
|       | Xiannian  | 44.40%     | 55.60%        | 100.00% |
| 1989  | Wan Li    | 45         | 29            | 74      |
|       |           | 60.80%     | 39.20%        | 100.00% |
| 1997  | Jiang     | 8          | 26            | 34      |
|       | Zemin     | 23.50%     | 76.50%        | 100.00% |
| 1999  | Zhu       | 1          | 18            | 19      |
|       | Rongji    | 5.30%      | 94.70%        | 100.00% |
| 2003  | Wen       | 1          | 9             | 10      |
|       | Jiabao    | 10.00%     | 90.00%        | 100.00% |
| 2006  | Hu Jintao | 2          | 17            | 19      |
|       |           | 10.50%     | 89.50%        | 100.00% |
| Total |           | 114        | 143           | 257     |
|       |           | 44.40%     | 55.60%        | 100.00% |

As the top leader in China, Deng's visit "marks the first official visit to the United States by a top-level Chinese leader since the Communist takeover in 1949," so the U.S. media were particularly interested in him. He was described as "China's spy, shrewd Vice Premier who planned and executed for China after decades of xenophobic isolation" (*Time*, Feb 5, 1979).

Jiang got lots of head portraits during his visit. Jiang's special image with human face and fusty appearance attracted great interest.

Zhu Rongji was seen as a "communist with a sense of humor" and very "charming," "the only man capable of imposing order on an economy of 1.3 billion money-hungry people" (*Time*, April 12, 1999).

Table 17 classifies the photos in terms of the activities they represent. Because

photographers attempt to frame formal state visits in terms of formal political activities, “attending official functions and programs” was the most common frame during the state visits, with 30% of all the photos. Because the leaders are all important figures, head portraits covered 12% of all the photos. Then, because a state visit also included cultural activities, “people attending cultural programs” (visiting different tourism sites, discussing cultural exchange issues) covered 11.7% of all the photos. China and the United States, two superpowers with different social systems and ideologies, are facing lots of common interests and competition. The photographer used the camera to present how people react to the Chinese leaders. Due to the fact that the United States and China differ on many topics such as human rights, trade and military activities, photographers used “people demonstrating or protesting” (28.4% of all the photos) to capture these areas of difference. Four visits had a lot of demonstrating. In Wan’s 1989 visit, 85.1% of the photos were portraying Chinese students and citizens demonstrating at Tiananmen Square. For Hu Jiantao’s 2006 visit, 21.1% of photo content was of demonstrating because of the sudden appearance of a Falun Gong practitioner. Due to the fact that Falun Gong was a highly organized political group “opposed to the Communist Party of China and the central government” (Xinhua, 1999), the Chinese government started to expel Falun Gong practitioners in 1996. When President Jiang Zemin visited the United States in 1997, Falun Gong supporters conducted demonstrations that resulted in a more negative tone in media coverage.

Table 15: Comparison of photo news sources by visits

| Year  | Leader        | Source           |                    |         |                         |                      |        |                    | Total   |
|-------|---------------|------------------|--------------------|---------|-------------------------|----------------------|--------|--------------------|---------|
|       |               | Associated Press | Xinhua News Agency | Reuters | Newspaper Staff Written | Special to the Times | UPI    | Others, non-listed |         |
| 1979  | Deng Xiaoping | 8                | 0                  | 0       | 30                      | 0                    | 10     | 38                 | 86      |
|       |               | 9.30%            | 0.00%              | 0.00%   | 34.90%                  | 0.00%                | 11.60% | 44.20%             | 100.00% |
| 1984  | Zhao Ziyang   | 0                | 0                  | 0       | 0                       | 0                    | 2      | 4                  | 6       |
|       |               | 0.00%            | 0.00%              | 0.00%   | 0.00%                   | 0.00%                | 33.30% | 66.70%             | 100.00% |
| 1985  | Li Xiannian   | 3                | 0                  | 0       | 3                       | 1                    | 1      | 1                  | 9       |
|       |               | 33.30%           | 0.00%              | 0.00%   | 33.30%                  | 11.10%               | 11.10% | 11.10%             | 100.00% |
| 1989  | Wan Li        | 18               | 1                  | 8       | 8                       | 0                    | 1      | 38                 | 74      |
|       |               | 24.30%           | 1.40%              | 10.80%  | 10.80%                  | 0.00%                | 1.40%  | 51.40%             | 100.00% |
| 1997  | Jiang Zemin   | 5                | 1                  | 3       | 19                      | 0                    | 0      | 6                  | 34      |
|       |               | 14.70%           | 2.90%              | 8.80%   | 55.90%                  | 0.00%                | 0.00%  | 17.60%             | 100.00% |
| 1999  | Zhu Rongji    | 1                | 0                  | 3       | 10                      | 0                    | 0      | 5                  | 19      |
|       |               | 5.30%            | 0.00%              | 15.80%  | 52.60%                  | 0.00%                | 0.00%  | 26.30%             | 100.00% |
| 2003  | Wen Jiabao    | 2                | 0                  | 1       | 3                       | 0                    | 0      | 4                  | 10      |
|       |               | 20.00%           | 0.00%              | 10.00%  | 30.00%                  | 0.00%                | 0.00%  | 40.00%             | 100.00% |
| 2006  | Hu Jintao     | 5                | 0                  | 3       | 6                       | 0                    | 0      | 5                  | 19      |
|       |               | 26.30%           | 0.00%              | 15.80%  | 31.60%                  | 0.00%                | 0.00%  | 26.30%             | 100.00% |
| Total |               | 42               | 2                  | 18      | 79                      | 1                    | 14     | 101                | 257     |
|       |               | 16.30%           | 0.80%              | 7.00%   | 30.70%                  | 0.40%                | 5.40%  | 39.30%             | 100.00% |

Table 16: Comparison of people portrayed in photos by visits

| Year  | Leader        | People                        |                        |                   |                                   |                         |                    |  |                   | Total   |
|-------|---------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|--|-------------------|---------|
|       |               | Top officials from both sides | Chinese officials only | US officials only | American people & Chinese leaders | Chinese people in China | Chinese in America | Chinese leaders and leaders from other countries | other, non-listed |         |
| 1979  | Deng Xiaoping | 26                            | 24                     | 1                 | 4                                 | 19                      | 2                  | 0  | 10                | 86      |
|       |               | 30.20%                        | 27.90%                 | 1.20%             | 4.70%                             | 22.10%                  | 2.30%              | 0.00%  | 11.60%            | 100.00% |
| 1984  | Zhao Ziyang   | 2                             | 4                      | 0                 | 0                                 | 0                       | 0                  | 0  | 0                 | 6       |
|       |               | 33.30%                        | 66.70%                 | 0.00%             | 0.00%                             | 0.00%                   | 0.00%              | 0.00%  | 0.00%             | 100.00% |
| 1985  | Li Xiannian   | 7                             | 2                      | 0                 | 0                                 | 0                       | 0                  | 0  | 0                 | 9       |
|       |               | 77.80%                        | 22.20%                 | 0.00%             | 0.00%                             | 0.00%                   | 0.00%              | 0.00%  | 0.00%             | 100.00% |
| 1989  | Wan Li        | 1                             | 5                      | 1                 | 2                                 | 61                      | 0                  | 3  | 1                 | 74      |
|       |               | 1.40%                         | 6.80%                  | 1.40%             | 2.70%                             | 82.40%                  | 0.00%              | 4.10%  | 1.40%             | 100.00% |
| 1997  | Jiang Zemin   | 14                            | 15                     | 0                 | 0                                 | 2                       | 2                  | 0  | 1                 | 34      |
|       |               | 41.20%                        | 44.10%                 | 0.00%             | 0.00%                             | 5.90%                   | 5.90%              | 0.00%  | 2.90%             | 100.00% |
| 1999  | Zhu Rongji    | 5                             | 7                      | 1                 | 0                                 | 2                       | 2                  | 0  | 2                 | 19      |
|       |               | 26.30%                        | 36.80%                 | 5.30%             | 0.00%                             | 10.50%                  | 10.50%             | 0.00%  | 10.50%            | 100.00% |
| 2003  | Wen Jiabao    | 4                             | 1                      | 0                 | 0                                 | 3                       | 1                  | 0  | 1                 | 10      |
|       |               | 40.00%                        | 10.00%                 | 0.00%             | 0.00%                             | 30.00%                  | 10.00%             | 0.00%  | 10.00%            | 100.00% |
| 2006  | Hu Jintao     | 7                             | 3                      | 0                 | 1                                 | 2                       | 5                  | 1  | 0                 | 19      |
|       |               | 36.80%                        | 15.80%                 | 0.00%             | 5.30%                             | 10.50%                  | 26.30%             | 5.30%  | 0.00%             | 100.00% |
| Total |               | 66                            | 61                     | 3                 | 7                                 | 89                      | 12                 | 4  | 15                | 257     |
|       |               | 25.70%                        | 23.70%                 | 1.20%             | 2.70%                             | 34.60%                  | 4.70%              | 1.60%  | 5.80%             | 100.00% |

Table 17: Comparison of photo frames by visits

| Year  | Leader        | Categories                        |  |                        |                        |                          |                                    |                   |
|-------|---------------|-----------------------------------|--|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|
|       |               | People attending cultural program | People attending official functions and programs | Leader's head portrait | Chinese people's lives | Greeting Chinese leaders | People demonstrating or protesting | other, non-listed |
| 1979  | Deng Xiaoping | 19                                | 26   | 7                      | 32                     | 1                        | 1                                  | 0                 |
|       |               | 22.10%                            | 30.20%   | 8.10%                  | 37.20%                 | 1.20%                    | 1.20%                              | 0.00%             |
| 1984  | Zhao Ziyang   | 3                                 | 0  | 3                      | 0                      | 0                        | 0                                  | 0                 |
|       |               | 50.00%                            | 0.00%  | 50.00%                 | 0.00%                  | 0.00%                    | 0.00%                              | 0.00%             |
| 1985  | Li Xiannian   | 0                                 | 8  | 1                      | 0                      | 0                        | 0                                  | 0                 |
|       |               | 0.00%                             | 88.90%   | 11.10%                 | 0.00%                  | 0.00%                    | 0.00%                              | 0.00%             |
| 1989  | Wan Li        | 0                                 | 4  | 6                      | 1                      | 0                        | 63                                 | 0                 |
|       |               | 0.00%                             | 5.40%  | 8.10%                  | 1.40%                  | 0.00%                    | 85.10%                             | 0.00%             |
| 1997  | Jiang Zemin   | 4                                 | 18   | 8                      | 0                      | 0                        | 4                                  | 0                 |
|       |               | 11.80%                            | 52.90%   | 23.50%                 | 0.00%                  | 0.00%                    | 11.80%                             | 0.00%             |
| 1999  | Zhu Rongji    | 2                                 | 9  | 1                      | 4                      | 1                        | 1                                  | 1                 |
|       |               | 10.50%                            | 47.40%   | 5.30%                  | 21.10%                 | 5.30%                    | 5.30%                              | 5.30%             |
| 2003  | Wen Jiabao    | 0                                 | 5  | 1                      | 2                      | 2                        | 0                                  | 0                 |
|       |               | 0.00%                             | 50.00%   | 10.00%                 | 20.00%                 | 20.00%                   | 0.00%                              | 0.00%             |
| 2006  | Hu Jintao     | 2                                 | 7  | 3                      | 2                      | 1                        | 4                                  | 0                 |
|       |               | 10.50%                            | 36.80%   | 15.80%                 | 10.50%                 | 5.30%                    | 21.10%                             | 0.00%             |
| Total |               | 30                                | 77   | 30                     | 41                     | 5                        | 73                                 | 1                 |
|       |               | 11.70%                            | 30.00%   | 11.70%                 | 16.00%                 | 1.90%                    | 28.40%                             | 0.40%             |

U.S. photographers, when given the choice of China's leader or the protestor, more frequently chose the protestors. This contributed to negative coverage. "People demonstrating or protesting" occupied the second largest percentage (28.4%) of all photos. The underlying reasons are basic differences in the ideological and social system between China and the United States, and oftentimes this broad and abstract difference was presented and demonstrated through conflicts in the political relations and economic relations.

After 1979, Chinese people's lives were changing rapidly, and the western countries were very interested in it. The United States paid attention to China and designed its foreign policy for China according to how it developed. So the Chinese people's lives were portrayed in larger numbers, constituting 18% of the photos.



Table 18: Comparison of photo tone by visits

| Year  | Leader        | ToneOverall |         |          | Total   | Average | Tone     |
|-------|---------------|-------------|---------|----------|---------|---------|----------|
|       |               | Positive    | Neutral | Negative |         |         |          |
| 1979  | Deng Xiaoping | 70          | 15      | 1        | 86      | 1.2     | positive |
|       |               | 81.40%      | 17.40%  | 1.20%    | 100.00% |         |          |
| 1984  | Zhao Ziyang   | 2           | 4       | 0        | 6       | 1.67    | neutral  |
|       |               | 33.30%      | 66.70%  | 0.00%    | 100.00% |         |          |
| 1985  | Li Xiannian   | 6           | 3       | 0        | 9       | 1.33    | postive  |
|       |               | 66.70%      | 33.30%  | 0.00%    | 100.00% |         |          |
| 1989  | Wan Li        | 10          | 9       | 55       | 74      | 2.61    | negative |
|       |               | 13.50%      | 12.20%  | 74.30%   | 100.00% |         |          |
| 1997  | Jiang Zemin   | 19          | 11      | 4        | 34      | 1.56    | positive |
|       |               | 55.90%      | 32.40%  | 11.80%   | 100.00% |         |          |
| 1999  | Zhu Rongji    | 7           | 9       | 3        | 19      | 1.79    | neutral  |
|       |               | 36.80%      | 47.40%  | 15.80%   | 100.00% |         |          |
| 2003  | Wen Jiabao    | 6           | 3       | 1        | 10      | 1.5     | positive |
|       |               | 60.00%      | 30.00%  | 10.00%   | 100.00% |         |          |
| 2006  | Hu Jintao     | 8           | 6       | 5        | 19      | 1.84    | neutral  |
|       |               | 42.10%      | 31.60%  | 26.30%   | 100.00% |         |          |
| Total |               | 128         | 60      | 69       | 257     | 1.77    | neutral  |
|       |               | 49.80%      | 23.30%  | 26.80%   | 100.00% |         |          |

For photos, there were four visits with a positive tone, two more than the text. Three visits had a neutral tone and only one had a negative tone. Overall, there were almost twice as many positive photos as there were negative photos. The reason for photos being more positive (1.77) than texts (1.91) is that photos showing the visiting leaders from China and the welcoming leaders from the United States were mostly neutral or positive, while the text reports often contained at least some negative tone. Political elites always looked happy in official and cultural activities. As was the case for text, Wan Li's 1989 visit also was the most negative for photos (2.61) because they portrayed the demonstrations at Tiananmen Square. However, the photo tone was less negative than the text (2.86) because many pictures showed positive communication among the army and the protestors while the content of the text report was about protestors' negative comments about the government.

After examining frequencies/number of words/size of the photos, section placement,

source/ quotation, frame and tone for both text and photos across the eight visits, it is clear that three state visits have comparatively more importance than others. From the frequency variable, the top three visits for text and photos are Deng's 1979 visit, Jiang's 1997 visit and Wan's 1989 visit. Observing these three visits for other variables, they have the most number of words, with Deng's 1979 visit (1st), Jiang's 1997 visit (2nd) and Wan's 1989 visit (3rd), and the 1979 and 1989 visits ranked as the top two in photos published in one column size. The 1979, 1989, and 1997 visits ranked as the top three for photos published in terms of front page placement. The 1979 and 1989 visits both had the majority of their photos on the front page. However, the 1997 visit was an exception in this case, with only a quarter of its photos on front page. The top three frequently dominant tones for the three visits were economics and trade, political relations and human rights.

### **Text and photo qualitative study**

#### **Deng's 1979 visit--a normalization of political relations, a reform and opening China-U.S. economic relation.**

The United States and China announced on December 15, 1978, that the two governments would establish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's January 1979 visit to Washington, DC, initiated a series of important, high-level exchanges, which continued until the spring of 1989. This resulted in many bilateral agreements -- especially in the fields of scientific, technological, and cultural interchange as well as trade relations. This visit took place during the "Green China period—1979 to 1989."

The Post-Normalization China-U.S. relations from 1979 to 1985 contained three top Chinese leaders' visits to the U.S. before the 1989 Tiananmen Issue. Visits during this period could be recognized as trip-driven diplomacy based on the congruence of economic and

political interests between the two countries, which had made it possible for them to develop an increasingly friendly relationship despite the unresolved Taiwan problem. According to Kim (1999), economically, the Chinese leadership's desire to obtain technology and capital from the United States in order to implement the "Four Modernizations" program constituted a crucial factor. Politically, the two nations had also come to share common interests, particularly in coping with the Soviet military buildup in Asia.

During this period of time, several things were considered as having the most important influence on the development of China-U.S. relations. First, a stable political situation in China was crucial to the healthy development of China-U.S. relations. Second, China's reform, opening, and modernization promoted the development of China-U.S. relations. Third, dealing with the Taiwan problem on the basis of the "one China" principle was critical to the healthy development of the China-U.S. relationship. The Taiwan issue remained the biggest obstacle and most sensitive question between the two countries. Fourth, the mechanism of dialogue between the two countries' leaders was developed and had a good start. This resulted in many bilateral agreements—especially in the fields of scientific, technological, and cultural interchange as well as trade relations. Since early 1979, the United States and China have initiated hundreds of joint research projects and cooperative programs under the Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology, the largest bilateral program.

Table 19: Text and photo summary of Deng's 1979 visit

| Visit                                       | Variable                     | Number/Percentage or specific values | Note                                |  |
|---|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| 1979 Deng Xiaoping's visit                  | Frequency                    | 127(27.1% of all visits )            | 1st among 8 visits                  |  |
|   | Front page placement         | 44(36.1% of the 1979 visit )         | 2nd among 8 visits                  |  |
|   | Top 3 Dominant Frames        | Political Relations                  |                                     |  |
|   |                              | Taiwan                               |                                     |  |
|   |                              | Economics and trade                  |                                     |  |
|   | Top 3 Total Frames           | Economics and trade                  |                                     |  |
| Political Relations<br>Taiwan/China Borders |                              |                                      |                                     |  |
| Overall Tone                                | Positive with the value 1.48 |                                      | 1st in positive tone among 8 visits |  |

Table 20: Photo summary of Deng's 1979 visit

| Visit  | Variable                      | Number/Percentage or specific values | Note                             |  |
|--|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| 1979 Deng Xiaoping's visit   | Frequency                     | 86(33.5%)                            | Rank 1st among 8 visits          |  |
|  | Front page placement          | 49(57% of the 1979 visit)            | Rank 3rd among 8 visits          |  |
|  | Top 3 Target people in photos | Top officials from both sides        |                                  |  |
|  |                               | Chinese officials                    |                                  |  |
|  |                               | Chinese people in China              |                                  |  |
|  | Top 3 Dominant Frames         | Chinese people's lives               |                                  |  |
| Leaders attending official functions and programs<br>Leaders attending cultural functional program |                               |                                      |                                  |  |
| Overall Tone   | Positive with the value 1.20  |                                      | 1st positive tone among 8 visits |  |

During the first state visit, three dominant frames were most frequent: Economics and trade (10.2%), Taiwan (11.8%) and political relations (18.9%) (See Table 19). The overall tone for this visit is positive with the value of 1.48. These frames matched underlying political and economic events that happened in China-U.S. relations before and during Deng's visit and the tone reflected good relations. The high degree of coverage was likely due to the major changes in the political and economic environment of the China-U.S. relations.

As noted earlier, Scheffe test results showed that the overall tone of Deng's 1979 visit is significantly more positive than Wan's 1989 visit, Jiang's 1997 visit and Hu's 2006 visit.

In terms of photos, results in Table 20 show that the most frequently shown people are top leaders from both sides, their performance during the visit and their relationship with each other. The second most frequently shown group of people was the visiting Chinese leaders.


The overall tone for both text and photo parts was positive, indicating a good start for the bilateral relationship. It is also the most positive visit among the eight.

Representative text/photo examples are shown in Table 21.

Table 21: Deng's 1979 visit dominant frames example

| Media                      | Frames              | Report examples   |
|----------------------------|---------------------|---|
| <i>The New York Times</i>  | Economics and trade | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Teng speaks of plans for imports in billions (Feb 4, <i>The New York Times</i>)<br/>Teng Hsiao-ping, China's deputy Prime Minister, arrived in Seattle this evening on the last stop of his American visit, after having told a Houston audience that China would need billions of dollars in foreign exchange, possibly scores of billions, in the next few years to carry out its modernization plan.<br/>His message about the prospects for American business in China and the relaxed, almost professional aplomb he has displayed in American crowds helped him overcome the initially cool welcome he received in Texas.</li> </ul>   |
|                            |                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The China trade: companies mob Peking<br/>...And with President Carter's decision finally to normalize relations with China in 1979, trade with the United States seems likely to surpass greatly the 1978 total of 1\$ billion, itself a record. Almost \$900 million of that represented American exports to China.</li> </ul>   |
|                            | Political relations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>China rehabilitates business class degraded in the Cultural Revolution (Jan 26, 1979, <i>The New York Times</i>)<br/>Property seized from China's former capitalists during the Cultural Revolution will be returned in an effort to enlist them in the national quest for modernization, the press agency Hsinhua reported today.</li> </ul>  |
|                            |                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>U.S. and China sign agreements; Carter sees an 'irreversible' trend (Feb 1, <i>The New York Times</i>)<br/>President Carter and Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping signed agreements today to provide a framework for what the President called "a new and irreversible course" in Chinese-American relations that both sides expect to follow after the normalization of relations.</li> <li>In Teng's Visit, A Natural Hit (Feb 1, 1979)<br/>From the administration's viewpoint, this first visit by a Chinese Communist leader has promoted the cause of normalization among skeptics in Congress and marked a new era of American global diplomacy without threatening to upset the delicate balance of American relations with the Soviet Union.<br/>From the Chinese perspective, it has further swung open the door to the American capital, technology and expertise that Mr. Teng wants so badly for his campaign to modernize China, and it has injected China's wary view of the Soviet Union directly into the strategic debate now under way here.</li> </ul> |
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | Taiwan              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Congress seen insistent on U.S. role in Taiwan's future (<i>The Washington Post</i>)<br/>Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping yesterday paid court to a Congress that appears increasingly likely to qualify the normalization of China—American relations with a formal assertion of U.S. interest in the future of Taiwan.</li> <li>Muskie says Peking needs no Taiwan warning (Jan 29, <i>The Washington Post</i>)<br/>"There is no doubt that the Chinese are well aware," Muskie continued, "that if they were to threaten Taiwan with force or to seek in any way to undermine Taiwan's well-being that that would trigger a negative American reaction which would cost them probably all of the benefits that they hope to achieve by normalization."</li> </ul>   |
| Newsweek                   | Political relations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Can Taiwan survive? (Feb 5, Newsweek)<br/>It hardly seems possible for two Chinese-speaking societies to have less in common than the Marxist China of Teng Hsiao-ping and the entrepreneurial Taiwan of president Chiang Ching-kuo. "Most people on Taiwan don't identify with the mainland," says Prof. Donald Zagoria of Columbia University.</li> </ul>  |

Figure 2: Deng Xiaoping attending rodeo in Tex. Feb 3, 1979. *The New York Times*



China's Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping, left, Chi Chao-chu, an interpreter, and Feng Yi, right, minister for science and technology, donned cowboy hats last night while attending rodeo in Simonton, Tex.

Figure 2 is famous among all the pictures taken during the first visit. It is framed as “Deng Xiaoping attending a cultural program,” a rodeo in Texas. In this picture, Deng is very approachable. He accepted the hat from the cow girl, when everyone was wondering what the communist country leader would do with this hat. Deng surprised everyone by wearing the hat immediately. This action revealed the leader’s humanity and the Chinese people’s amicability. Embracing the western cultural symbol--a cow girl hat-- Deng’s pose sent out the information to the world: China and the United States are not enemies any more; China is friendly towards the new China-U.S. relations.

But the associated text’s main frame is “travel arrangements.” This article was published with the text “Texas greets Teng with band, backlash and rain.” In the text part it talked about Taiwan and quoted the public view to describe Deng as a “red murderer” and referred

to China as a “captive Red nation.” Thus the picture and the text are different in tone and dominant frame.

These differences indicate the contradictions apparent in journalistic coverage of the visit. On one hand, each side was curious about the other and tried to show its friendship in the early stages after the establishment of diplomatic relations, which led to the friendly photo. On the other hand, due to previous history and lack of contact, the U.S. side still held a suspicious attitude, which led to the negative tone in the text report.

Figure 3: “Can Taiwan survive? Feb 5, 1979. *Newsweek*”



Figure 3’s picture was selected to correspondingly show the Taiwan frame. Those armed and practicing soldiers from Taiwan expressed a nervous atmosphere to the audience, which reminded the audience about the importance of the Taiwan issue in China-U.S. relations.



Figure 4: “Teng’s new deal”: Chinese people’s life. Feb 5, 1979. *Newsweek*.



A total of 31% of the photos were classified as “Chinese people’s lives” during the first visit.

These pictures, including Figure 4’s children, citizens, social workers, or even simply the streets, along with the travelling spots like the Great Wall, revealed the United States’ huge interests in China. Although they showed the common life in China, the photographers also tended to search for some uncommon elements, such as this one above in which elementary school girls from China are studying English. This would not have occurred during the Cultural Revolution. What the students were doing includes studying a foreign language, and shows a great improvement had been made after implementation of the Opening and Reform Policy in China. The tone of these pictures about Chinese people’s lives is optimistic and positive, showing the photographer’s confidence in China. This helped the endorsement of better China-U.S. relations.

**Zhao Ziyang’s 1984 visit—a start of China-U.S. technology trade and an easing of Taiwan tension**

High-level exchanges continued to be a significant means for developing the China-U.S. relations in the 1980s. Under the "trip-driven" diplomacy in the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang made reciprocal visits in 1984.

According to Ross (1990), China-U.S. relations experienced significant change during the Reagan administration. In contrast to the 1970s, when China criticized American "appeasement" of the Soviet Union and U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations, and the early Reagan years, when China threatened to downgrade relations over American arms sales to Taiwan and badgered Washington on a host of lesser issues, relations were remarkably free from challenges to a developing and expanding relationship from late 1983 until the June 1989 Tiananmen Issue.

Three important things occurred during the period after Deng Xiaoping's 1979 visit and before Li Xiannian's 1985 visit that affected China-U.S. relations. First, the first months of 1982 saw intensive negotiations between Washington and Beijing on the Taiwan arms sales issue. American officials proposed a joint communiqué combining Washington's pledge not to increase its sales of military equipment to Taiwan with China's public commitment to a peaceful resolution of the problem of reunifying Taiwan and the mainland. The result of this intensified effort was a China-American joint communiqué of August 17, 1982, which is a watershed in the relationship, reflecting Washington's eventual understanding of the need to be sensitive to Beijing's interest in a "one-China" policy. With the issuance of the August 17 joint communiqué, the tone of U.S.-China diplomacy became more positive. Second, the U.S. announced relaxed restrictions on American technology exports to China, which resulted in more technology trade (economic) and stable (political) diplomatic relations. The American willingness to expedite technology transfer went a long way toward allaying Beijing's

distrust of President Reagan. In addition, it heralded a new phase in the China-U.S. relations, a phase based more on economic cooperation than on strategic considerations ( *The New York Times*, July 17, 1983). Third, Improvements in technology transfer and textiles did not, however, entirely eliminate the contentious Taiwan issue.

**Table 22: Text summary of Zhao's 1984 visit**

| Visit                    | Variable                     | Number/Percentage or specific values | Note                                  |  |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 1984 Zhao Ziyang's visit | Frequency                    | 40 (8.5% of all visits )             | Rank 5th among 8 visits               |  |
|                          | Front page placement         | 8 (20% of the 1984 visit )           | Rank 5th among 8 visits               |  |
|                          | Top 3 Dominant Frames        | Political Relations                  |                                       |  |
|                          |                              | Economics and trade                  |                                       |  |
|                          |                              | Taiwan                               |                                       |  |
|                          | Top 3 Total Frames           | Economics and trade                  |                                       |  |
| Taiwan                   |                              |                                      |                                       |  |
| Overall Tone             | Positive with the value 1.60 |                                      | Rank 2nd positive tone among 8 visits |  |

**Table 23: Photo summary of Zhao's 1984 visit**

| Visit                    | Variable                      | Number/Percentage or specific values          | Note                                  |  |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|--|
| 1984 Zhao Ziyang's visit | Frequency                     | 6(2.3%)                                       | Rank 8th among 7 visits               |  |
|                          | Front page placement          | 4(66.7%) of the 1984 visit                    | Rank 1st among 8 visits               |  |
|                          | Top 3 Target people in photos | Chinese officials                             |                                       |  |
|                          |                               | Top officials from both sides                 |                                       |  |
|                          | Top 3 Dominant Frames         | Chinese people's lives                        |                                       |  |
|                          |                               | Leaders attending cultural functional program |                                       |  |
| Overall Tone             | Neutral with the value 1.67   |   | Rank 5th positive tone among 8 visits |  |

Table 22 showed that “political relations” (25%), “economics and trade” (22.5%) and “Taiwan” (12.5%) were the top three dominant frames, which exactly matched the most important issues during this period. Technology/nuclear trade-related events were coded as “economics and trade” rather than “military” because during this visit the discussion about

Chinese weapons was more focused on America's technology transfer, and trade with China through economic channels.

During the second state visit, Table 23 shows 66.7% of photos appeared on the front page, the overall tone for this period was neutral with a value of 1.67 and "people attending the cultural program" and "leader's head portrait" are the only two photo frames. From the "people category," Zhao Ziyang was portrayed as one who can "skillfully down-play past difficulties. He is at ease with foreigners and has a reputation as a deft, and occasionally witty diplomat. After he became a member of the Politburo in 1979, he surprised many Chinese, long bored by tight restrictions on dress, by appearing in public in a Western tie and jacket, the first high official to do so since the Cultural Revolution" (*Time*, Jan 16, 1984, p.47). Zhao's domestic agricultural reform in China's Sichuan province successfully increased productivity by 25%, and Deng Xiaoping was so impressed that he promoted Zhao to the top government. So Zhao's innovation and free spirit was highly praised by the Western world.

Representative text/photo examples are shown in Table 24:

Table 24: Zhao's 1984 visit dominant frames example

| Media                      | Frames              | Report examples  |
|----------------------------|---------------------|--|
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | Economics and trade | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>U.S., China near accord on nuclear pact           <p>The nuclear cooperation negotiations are "at the top of our agenda," .....reporters were told that a broad range of other bilateral and international issues will be discussed, and that signing ceremonies will be held for already-completed pacts on industrial and technical cooperation, and cultural exchanges.</p> <p>Beyond this, the official said, the central U.S. aim for the visit is to "consolidate" a China-American relationship previously characterized by sudden shifts and reverses.</p> <p>Reagan is scheduled to continue the series of top-level exchanges by visiting China in April in return for Zhao's trip here.</p> </li> </ul>  |
|                            | Political relations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chinese Premier Arrives for Meeting with Reagan (Jan 09, 1984, <i>The Washington Post</i>)           <p>Zhao is the first high-ranking official of the People's Republic of China to visit the United States since Deng Xiaoping sealed the 1979 agreement opening full diplomatic relations between the two countries.</p> <p>Zhao's visit precedes a reciprocal trip Reagan will take to China in April. At that time, the two leaders are expected to sign exchange agreements on trade, science and technology.</p> <p>Zhao is expected to ask Reagan for continued compliance with a 1982 pact that set limits on arms sales to Taiwan while the sales are gradually phased out.</p> </li> </ul>   |
| Time                       | Economics and trade | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>More sweet than sour—Zhao's visit strengthens China-American relations (Time, Jan 16, 1984)           <p>Said Zhao at the White House ceremony: "I come as a friendly envoy of the Chinese people for the purpose of seeking increased mutual Understanding."</p> <p>The concrete results of Zhao's visit—"two bilateral agreements"—were a lot of major breakthroughs. The first extends an earlier accord that established the exchange of scientific, information and personnel. The second paved the way for more specific agreements on joint development of off-shore oil, coal and others.</p> <p>More nettlesome was a planned action on nuclear cooperation that would permit China to buy U.S. nuclear reactors and fuel for peaceful purposes.</p> </li> </ul> |

Figure 5. Reagan walks Premier to his car after signing ceremonies for economic and scientific accords. Jan 12, 1984, *Time*

In Figure 5, Zhao Ziyang was attending a casual cultural program with President Reagan. Two leaders are hand-in-hand, walking away from an official program, so it can be recognized as a casual official time between the two leaders. It is not easy to find a precious moment like this, even though we don't know if it was for political show or not. At least these two leaders were happy and satisfied with the visit, which revealed good relations during that time period.

### **Li Xiannian's 1985 visit—strengthened economic, military and educational exchanges**

In July 1985, President Li Xiannian traveled to the United States, the first such visit by a head of state from China.

In the summer of 1985, further steps for bilateral cooperation were taken during the visit of Chinese President Li Xianian to the United States with the signing of the China-America nuclear accord providing a legal framework for U.S. support of China's nuclear power program.

In spite of significant progress in Chinese-American cooperation, Taiwan still remained a source of irritation in China-American relations. In light of Deng Xiaoping's more conciliatory treatment of the Taiwan issue, however, Bush left Beijing with confidence that the United States and China would be able to manage to deal with it (Kim & Hammersmith, 1986).

During Li Xiannian's visit, Table 25 shows the two frames "economics and trade" and "political relations" were the most common. As was the case in Zhao Ziyang's previous visit, the "economics and trade" frame focused on nuclear technology trade. As a result of trade, political relations between China and the United States became better than ever. The United

States and China also stepped up cultural and scholarly ties by signing the broadest educational and cultural accord reached between the U.S. and a communist country. The Taiwan and China-Soviet relation frames were not found much in the four publications, which didn't match the importance of China's relationship with Taiwan and the Soviet Union during this time period. The reason for this might be due to the emphasis on trade harmony.

During the third state visit, Table 26 shows 44.4% of the photos appeared on the front page, the overall tone for this period is positive and "people attending the official program" and "leader's head portrait" are the only two photo frames.

**Table 25: Text summary of Li's 1985 visit**

|                                |                             |   |                         |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|-------------------------|
| 1985 Li<br>Xiannian's<br>visit | Frequency                   | 24(5.1% of all visits )                     | Rank 8th among 8 visits |
|                                | Front page placement        | 24(20% of the 1984 visit )                  | Rank 3rd among 8 visits |
|                                | Top 3 Dominant<br>Frames    | Economics and trade                         |                         |
|                                |                             | Leadership personality                      |                         |
|                                | Top 3 Total Frames          | Economics and trade                         |                         |
|                                |                             | Military<br>Leadership personality          |                         |
| Overall Tone                   | Neutral with the value 1.75 | Rank 6th in positive tone<br>among 8 visits |                         |

**Table 26: Photo summary of Li's 1985 visit**

| Visit                          | Variable                         | Number/Percentage or specific values                 | Note                    |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|-------------------------|
| 1985 Li<br>Xiannian's<br>visit | Frequency                        | 9 (3.5%of all the visits)                            | Rank 2nd among 7 visits |
|                                | Front page placement             | 4 (44.4% of the 1984 visit)                          | Rank 4th among 8 visits |
|                                | Top 3 Target people in<br>photos | Top officials from both sides                        |                         |
|                                |                                  | Chinese officials                                    |                         |
|                                | Top 3 Dominant<br>Frames         | Leaders attending official functions<br>and programs |                         |
|                                |                                  | Leaders' head portraits                              |                         |
| Overall Tone                   | Positive with the value 1.33     | Rank 2nd in positive tone<br>among 8 visits          |                         |

Representative test is shown in Table 27.

Table 27: Li's 1985 visit dominant frames example

| Media                      | Frames              | Report examples   |
|----------------------------|---------------------|---|
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | Economics and trade | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>U.S. and China sign nuclear-power pact (July 24, 1985, <i>The Washington Post</i>)           <p>The United States and China signed an unusual nuclear-power cooperation agreement yesterday—the high point of the U.S. visit of Chinese President Li Xiannian. President Reagan, ..... met with Li for half an hour at the White House, telling him in Chinese that U.S.-Chinese relations should be in the spirit of “hu jing, hu hui: mutual respect, mutual benefit.”</p> <p>The nuclear agreement, one of four trade and educational pacts signed yesterday, was described as “a framework agreement” that sets conditions for permitting U.S. companies to bid for an estimated \$6 billion in potential Chinese nuclear power plant construction business.</p> </li> </ul> |
|                            | Taiwan              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Li hints at trade expansion-Taiwan link (July 25, 1985, <i>The Washington Post</i>)           <p>President Li Xiannian of China hinted yesterday that expanded U.S. access to China’s huge market might be linked to a resolution of the status of Taiwan.</p> <p>Speaking to American and Chinese businessmen at the National Council for U.S.-China Trade, Li said the Taiwan question remains “a major obstacle to be surmounted” in improving U.S.-Chinese relations. At the same time, he said, “good political relations are an indispensable condition of the development of economic cooperation.” (This can be recognized as a political relations frame as well)</p> </li> </ul>   |

In Figure 6, Li Xiannian was attending official program with President Reagan. During this period, the China-U.S. relationship was going well. Major agreement in nuclear aspects, science, technology and cultural exchange were gradually developed. This group picture, including the Reagans and the Lis, showed a harmonious friendship atmosphere. Nancy Reagan wore the traditional Chinese dress (Qi Pao), demonstrating the beauty of the mixture of Eastern and Western culture. Four people were looking further, smiling, like they were looking forward to better China-U.S. relations.





Figure 6: President Reagan, President Li Xiannian, Nancy Reagan and Li's wife Li Jiamei. July 24, 1985, *The Washington Post*.

### **Wan Li's 1989 visit—a short visit with full media focus on China's siege**

Just before the Tiananmen Incident on June 4, 1989, Wan Li, the Chairman of the National People's Congress, came to the United States for a visit from May 22 to May 23. He was considered an aide from China and had met with the Vice President and Secretary of State. An unofficial meeting between Mr. Wan and President Bush was canceled because "it would be inappropriate at this time," considering the upheaval in relations between demonstrators and the government in China. Wan only stayed for two days in the United States though the original schedule was to visit four days. He flew back to China to ease the intense situation in China. Table 28 shows Wan's 1989 visit had an overall tone significantly lower than the rest of the seven because it's the one with no overall positive tone frames and the most negative tone (2.87). Thus Wan's 1989 visit can be considered a huge turning

point in China-U.S. relations.

**Table 28: Text summary of Wan's 1989 visit**

| Visit               | Variable              | Number/Percentage or specific values | Note                                  |  |
|---------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 1989 Wan Li's visit | Frequency             | 73(15.6% of all visits )             | Rank 7th among 8 visits               |  |
|                     | Front page placement  | 24(39.7% of the 1984 visit )         | Rank 1st among 8 visits               |  |
|                     | Top 3 Dominant Frames | Human rights                         |                                       |  |
|                     |                       | Military                             |                                       |  |
|                     |                       | Economics and trade                  |                                       |  |
|                     | Top 3 Total Frames    | Human rights                         |                                       |  |
| Military            |                       |                                      |                                       |  |
| Overall Tone        |                       | Negative with the value 2.87         | Rank 1st negative tone among 8 visits |  |

**Table 29: Photo summary of Wan's 1989 visit**

| Visit                   | Variable                      | Number/Percentage or specific values             | Note                                  |  |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|--|
| 1989 Wan Li's visit     | Frequency                     | 74(28.8% of all the visits)                      | Rank 8th among 7 visits               |  |
|                         | Front page placement          | 45(60.8%) of the 1984 visit                      | Rank 2nd among 8 visits               |  |
|                         | Top 3 Target people in photos | Chinese people in China                          |                                       |  |
|                         |                               | Chinese officials                                |                                       |  |
|                         |                               | Chinese leaders and leaders from other countries |                                       |  |
|                         | Top 3 Dominant Frames         | People demonstrating or protesting               |                                       |  |
| Leaders' head portraits |                               |  |                                       |  |
| Overall Tone            |                               | Negative with the value 2.61                     | Rank 1st negative tone among 8 visits |  |

During this period, there were proportionately more text reports (39.7%) and photos (60.8%) (Table 29) published on the front page, which showed high news importance. The major frame was “human rights” (42.5%), followed by “military” (13.7%), “economics and trade” (12.3%) and “leadership personality” (9.6%). During this period, “human rights” was mentioned when the report discussed that protesting students will make further steps toward democracy, not a communist dictatorship. The “military” frame was usually identified when army troops were deployed and other countries warned, or suggested that China not use military actions against the students and demonstrators.

During the fourth state visit, there were 74 photos published, which is 28.8% of all 257

photos. A total of 68.5% of the photos appeared on the front page, and the overall tone for photos in this period is negative (2.61). But compared to the text reports mean of 2.87, photos were less negative than the text because many of the photos contained the dancing students and citizens on Tiananmen Square and the peaceful communications between the protestors and the soldiers. The U.S. media paid great attention to analyzing the Chinese leadership levels and tried to find out which leader played the critical role in this incident, so photos of leaders' head portraits and texts about the key Chinese leaders in the Tiananmen Incident decision were shown frequently. "People demonstrating or protesting"(85.1%) and "leader's head portrait"(8.1%) were the frequently coded frames. Results showed that Wan Li was not the important person; Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng were the decision makers. There were not many photos about Wan Li's actual visit in the United States since the media focused on the domestic situation in China. Representative text is shown in Table 30.

**Table 30: Wan's 1989 visit dominant frames example**

| Media                     | Frames              | Report examples   |
|---------------------------|---------------------|---|
| <i>The New York Times</i> | Human Rights        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Upheaval in China: From Emigres, Outpouring of support (May 21, 1989, <i>The New York Times</i>)</li> </ul> <p>Under a banner proclaiming "Dictator No, Democracy Yes," a 26-year-old Brown University student, who asked to remain anonymous because she feared reprisals against her family in China, said of the protesters in Beijing: "the students are not alone. We have a lot of supporters all over the world.</p>                                  |
|                           | Military            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chinese aide, visiting U.S., sees room for compromise (May 23, 1989, <i>The New York Times</i>)</li> </ul> <p>The Chinese official, Wan Li, the Chairman of the National People's Congress, told Mr. Quayle that the students' "reasonable demands" could eventually be met and the army troops had been deployed around Beijing to maintain order, not to suppress the students.</p>  |
|                           | Economics and Trade | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chinese aide, visiting U.S., sees room for compromise (May 23, 1989, <i>The New York Times</i>)</li> </ul> <p>The Administration official said Mr. Wan seemed to position himself carefully between Prime Minister Li Peng and the demonstrators. Mr. Wan was reported to have said China must have normal stability if it is to continue modernizing its economic system, and end the student unrest before it can take further steps toward democracy.</p> |

In figure 7, Vice President Dan Quayle meets in Washington with Wan Li, right, the chairman of China's legislature. Mr. Wan said at the meeting that there will be no bloodshed in Beijing unless the demonstrators resort to violence.



Vice President Dan Quayle meeting yesterday in Washington with Wan Li, right, the chairman of China's legislature. Mr. Wan said at the meeting that there will be no bloodshed in Beijing unless the demonstrators resort to violence.

Figure 7: Upheaval in China: Visitor from the Maelstrom. May 23, 1989. *The New York Times*.

## The 8 Disparate Decision Makers: Will They Be Able to Restore Calm?

By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF  
Special to The New York Times

BEIJING, May 21 — As Beijing's political crisis grows more acute, the power to resolve the deadlock and end the struggle seems to be in the hands of a relatively small number of people. Only the popular uprising binds them together, for they range from Politburo members to university students.

Some, like the senior leader, Deng Xiaoping, are household names; others are not well known even in China. A combination of events and their own willingness to play a historic role have created the conjunction that leaves them to deal with the crisis.

These are the decision makers and the roles they play.

### Deng Xiaoping

At 84 years of age, Mr. Deng now holds only one official post, chairman of the Central Military Commission, and normally works only in the mornings. But he still exerts almost absolute control over the Communist Party and Government. An illustration of his power came last week when the five-man standing committee of the Politburo met in his heavily guarded house at the end of an alley in the Dianmen district of the capital.

Although not a member of the committee, Mr. Deng attended the meeting and at the end decided to strip the Communist Party leader, Zhao Ziyang, of all his powers, party officials with access to top-level information said.

Mr. Deng's power stems from two factors: his apparently absolute control over the military and his immense contribution to China's modernization.

Far more than anyone else, he is responsible for the economic revolution that has more than doubled real incomes over the last decade. This contribution and his long revolutionary experience have given him a great moral authority, although this has greatly deteriorated in the last few weeks.

In recent weeks, too, some generals have for the first time privately criticized him, but Mr. Deng nevertheless has more authority over the army than anyone else.



### Zhao Ziyang

The loss of his powers was Mr. Zhao's penalty for pursuing a moderate line toward the students and for challenging Mr. Deng. A 69-year-old enthusiast of more rapid liberalization, Mr. Zhao had not been all that popular recently, partly because he was associated with inflation and other difficulties and partly because his children are widely believed to use the family's name to make money.

But in the last two days Mr. Zhao's stock has soared because of his effective dismissal. Many people cast him in the traditional Chinese role of the wise adviser who is punished for saying what the emperor (Mr. Deng) did not want to hear.

Mr. Zhao is now believed to be fighting to regain his authority and to edge out Mr. Deng and Prime Minister Li Peng in the process. If that happens, he will replace Mr. Deng as paramount leader, although it is unlikely that any leader soon will have quite the authority that Mr. Deng enjoyed.

Support for Mr. Zhao in the 17-member Politburo is uncertain, but is believed to be considerable in the party's Central Committee. But the committee members have by this point in their careers become so used to obeying orders that it is not clear whether they will speak out against Mr. Deng and support Mr. Zhao at their next meeting.



### Li Peng

A 60-year-old technocrat with expertise in hydroelectric power and engineering, Mr. Li is said to be an excellent administrator but not a visionary. A dry man, he often has difficulty gaining respect in China. For example, his office is reported to be bathtubs that would overlook the compound in which Mr. Li lives and works, and his staff says this would be a security risk.

Mr. Li, who was trained in the Soviet Union, is often presented incorrectly as being against economic change. Rather, he believes that it is essential first to build economic institutions such as a banking and legal system and then to proceed with

further changes. He is wary of the unintended effects of new economic programs.

While Mr. Li does not have longtime protégés in major positions in the party or Government, he does apparently have said support among a group of elderly statesmen like the retired leaders Bo Yibo, Peng Zhen and Chen Yun. These do not have a vote in the Politburo, but still exercise strong influence.

Mr. Li is now widely and bitterly disliked in Beijing, and many expect his downfall. But he has been underestimated before. Just a year ago, many diplomats believed he would not last long in the leadership because of his lack of connections around the country. Instead, he is the most powerful man after Mr. Deng, at least for now.



### Qiao Shi

A somewhat mysterious man who is in charge of intelligence and security matters, Mr. Qiao is the crucial swing vote on the standing committee of the Politburo. Mr. Zhao now has the support of Hu Qili, the member in charge of propaganda, while Mr. Li has the backing of Yao Yilin, the economic czar. Mr. Qiao supported Mr. Li at first but is now being heavily lobbied and the Zhao forces hope to sway him.

Little is known about the political or economic views of the 65-year-old Mr. Qiao. But late last month he undermined Mr. Deng, who had ordered a violent crackdown on April 27 against student demonstrators.

Mr. Qiao, who had ordered a violent crackdown on April 27 against student demonstrators, issued an order the evening before that policemen and troops should avoid violence, party and Government officials said. Mr. Qiao is believed to stress the importance of order, but is also distressed by the prospect of violent repression of demonstrators.

If Mr. Li is discredited and Mr. Zhao cannot muster enough support to regain his authority, Mr. Qiao could emerge as the



next Communist Party General Secretary.

### Wan Li

A 73-year-old elderly statesman, Mr. Wan serves in what has been the somewhat ceremonial post of head of the National People's Congress, the normally rubber stamp parliament. But a move is now afoot to use the standing committee of the Congress to revoke martial law and possibly even to use the full Congress to impeach Mr. Li.

Such moves would probably require a certain amount of cooperation from Mr. Wan and therefore all factions are trying to win his support. Mr. Wan, who is on a visit to Canada and the United States, probably has conflicting loyalties.

On the one hand, he is an old friend of Mr. Deng and would be unlikely to turn against him. On the other hand, he favors political liberalization and does not regard the student movement to be so serious as to require a military crackdown. If the Congress is used as a means to challenge Mr. Li, Mr. Wan will play a crucial role.

### Yan Mingfu

Mr. Yan is perhaps the Communist Party official with the best reputation among the demonstrators and he could rise very far if Mr. Zhao is restored to power. The 58-year-old head of the party's United Front Department, which maintains links with non-Communist organizations, Mr. Yan was responsible for negotiating with the hunger strikers on Tiananmen Square and expressed sympathy for them in a speech he gave there.

A strong supporter of conciliation, Mr. Yan was overruled by Mr. Li and other top leaders, and subsequently was hospitalized for illness and exhaustion after his marathon negotiation efforts. Earlier, Mr. Yan was one of the key figures in preventing a harsh crackdown on April 27. Mr. Yan, who has considerable influence on Mr. Qiao, led a campaign to convince him and other high leaders that violence would be counterproductive and inappropriate.

### Wuer Kaixi

A 21-year-old student from Xinjiang Province in northwest China, Mr. Wuer is head of the interuniversity student committee that has planned the protests for the last month. A freshman who is an eloquent and witty speaker, Mr. Wuer is a member

of the minority Uighur ethnic group, rather than a Han Chinese, and that accounts for his unusual name.

A natural leader, Mr. Wuer was merciless toward Mr. Li in a nationally televised meeting last week, even criticizing him for being late.

The ever-flamboyant Mr. Wuer was on a hunger strike at the time and even fainted during the meeting. He had to be revived by a group of doctors and nurses who were hovering in the background.

While Mr. Wuer is bitterly critical of corruption and inefficiency in the Government and Communist Party, he is not against the party itself. His father is a party official, and he says he too would like to join the party.

### Wang Dan

Mr. Wang, a 20-year-old history student, is less eloquent and dynamic than Mr. Wuer, but he has been the main organizer of the student movement at Beijing University, the most important campus in the country. Mr. Wang, whose large glasses and small frame make him look the



stereotype of an intellectual, is less enthusiastic about the Communist Party than Mr. Wuer, but says he is not against the "correct" leadership of the party, although he emphasizes the word "correct."

At first one of the more militant of the student leaders, Mr. Wang goes out of his way to sound reasonable and conciliatory. He emphasizes the importance of nonviolent tactics, and it is his impressive organizational skills that has insured that the student demonstrations have maintained high discipline. Mr. Wang and other student leaders would presumably like Mr. Deng and Mr. Li to step down, but they would settle for less if the matter came to negotiations. The leadership of the student organizations often is less radical than those who follow, perhaps because the leaders have more reason to fear getting in trouble. But the general attitude of the students and their hostility toward Mr. Li and Mr. Deng might constrain Mr. Wang and Mr. Wuer in reaching an agreement to leave Tiananmen Square and return to their campuses.

Figure 8: Upheaval in China: The Movers and Shakers. May 22, 1989. *The New York Times*.

Figure 8 shows profile pictures of key leaders in China who made decisions about the future in the Tiananmen Incident.



Journalists marching in Beijing yesterday with a banner that read, "Lift Martial Law and Protect the Capital." The marchers were from the Communist Party's official newspaper, People's Daily. Agence France-Presse

Figure 9: Upheaval in China: Army in Crisis. 7 Top Ex-Commanders Issue a Warning. May 23, 1989. *The New York Times*.

Figure 9 shows the brave Chinese protestors, who were journalists from the People's Daily, The largest newspaper in China. The reporters used to be the government's mouthpiece but at the upheaval moment even they stood up to demonstrate and asked for democracy. This had rarely been seen in China and can reflect the turmoil level in 1989.



A worker in Shanghai trying to talk a soldier into joining the demonstration outside the Government offices.

Figure 10: Upheaval in China: Hope is in the air. Changes at the Top are Hinted in Beijing. May 24, 1989. *The New York Times*.

Figure 10 shows good relations and communications between soldiers and protestors. A worker in Shanghai was trying to talk a soldier into joining the demonstration outside the Government offices.

### **Jiang Zemin's 1997 visit—a visit full of arguments about human rights**

After the Tiananmen Incident, the China-U.S. trade relationship was disrupted. Another negative event was the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, during which the pending Taiwan presidential election triggered a military exercise by China. The United States dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region, threatening the peace and security of both countries. From this crisis, both sides realized a peaceful strategic partnership was the best solution. Finally, tensions in the Taiwan Strait diminished, relations between the United

States and China improved, and high-level exchanges and progress on numerous bilateral issues, including human rights, nonproliferation, and trade increased. President Jiang Zemin visited the United States in the fall of 1997, the first state visit to the United States by a Chinese president since 1985. In connection with that visit, the two sides came to a consensus on implementation of their 1985 agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, as well as economic and human rights issues to improve bilateral relations.

**Table 31: Text summary of Jiang's 1997 visit**

| Visit                    | Variable              | Number/Percentage or specific values | Note  |  |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| 1997 Jiang Zemin's visit | Frequency             | 90 (19.2% of all visits )            | Rank 2 <sup>nd</sup> among 8 visits                         |  |
|                          | Front page placement  | 25 (27.8% of the 1979 visit)         | Rank 4th among 8 visits                                     |  |
|                          | Top 3 Dominant Frames |                                      | Human Rights  |  |
|                          |                       |                                      | Political Relations   |  |
|                          |                       |                                      | Economics and trade   |  |
|                          | Top 3 Total Frames    |                                      | Human Rights  |  |
|                          |                       | Economics and trade                  |   |  |
| Overall Tone             |                       | Neutral with the value 1.92          | Rank 6th in positive tone (4th neutral tone) among 8 visits |  |

**Table 32: Photo summary of Jiang's 1997 visit**

| Visit                    | Variable                      | Number/Percentage or specific values   | Note                                     |  |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|--|--|--|
| 1997 Jiang Zemin's visit | Frequency                     | 34 (13.2% of all photos)   | Rank 3rd among 8 visits                  |  |
|                          | Front page placement          | 8 (23.5% of the 1979 visit)  | Rank 5th among 8 visits                  |  |
|                          | Top 3 Target people in photos |  | Chinese official                         |  |
|                          |                               |  | Top officials from both sides            |  |
|                          |                               |  | Top officials from both sides            |  |
|                          | Top 3 Dominant Frames         |  | Leader's head portrait                   |  |
|                          |                               | Leaders attending cultural functional program/people demonstrating or protesting |  |  |
| Overall Tone             |                               | Positive with the value 1.56   | Rank 4th in positive tone among 8 visits |  |

During this fifth state visit, Table 31 shows the three most dominant frames were human rights (32.2%), political relations (11.8%) and economics and trade (14.4%). The Taiwan frame only occupied 1.1%. The possible reason might be a relatively stable bilateral relationship after the Taiwan Strait Crisis. Developing bilateral economic relations should be

the common goal. The overall tone for this visit is a neutral 1.92. The United States held a suspicious attitude towards China for eight years after the Tiananmen Square Incident.

During the fifth state visit, Table 32 shows there were 34 photos published, which is 13.2% of all 257 photos. This number ranks the third among all eight visits. A total of 23.5% of photos appeared on the front page, and the overall tone for this period is positive. But compared to the text report that has a neutral tone, the photos are more positive than the text because lots of photos reflected the smiling Jiang and how this Chinese top leader reacted to the protestors rather than just showing the demonstrations during his visit. “People attending official functions and programs” (52.9%) and “people attending cultural program” (11.8%) and “people demonstrating or protesting” (11.8%) are the most frequent frames.


Representative text is shown in Table 33.



Table 33: Jiang's 1997 visit dominant frames examples

| Media                      | Frames  | Report examples   |
|----------------------------|---|---|
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | Human Rights  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coalition in U.S. Closes Ranks for human Rights protests (Oct 28, 1997, <i>The Washington Post</i>) <p>Protest organizers say they do not want to isolate China because of its human rights abuses. Like the Clinton administration, they say their goal is to encourage the United States to deepen its relationship with the world's most populous nation. But, organizers say, they want the administration to do so by pursuing a vigorous commitment to human rights and democracy.</p> <p>"We support Jiang coming here, and we also support the president going over there—so long as he stops being so wimpy," said John Ackerly, president of the International Campaign for Tibet.</p> </li> </ul>   |
|                            | Political Relations   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Asked About '89 Protests, Jiang Alludes to 'Mistakes' protests (Nov 2, 1997, <i>The Washington Post</i>) <p>Although protests have shadowed Jiang at every stop, he had been well-shielded from demonstrators before today.</p> <p>Jiang's statements about Tiananmen probably do not presage an immediate change of policy as the Chinese government has moved in recent years to silence political dissent even as it embraces more open markets.</p> </li> </ul>  |
|                            |   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Effects of visit on Support of U.S.-China ties Awaited (Nov 2, 1997, <i>The Washington Post</i>) <p>For the Clinton administration, the question as Jiang flies home is which image of him will prevail. The president and his foreign policy aides designed last week's summit meeting in the hope of broadening U.S. popular support for Clinton's commitment to build good relations with China. . . . . Clinton's policy has strong support in the U.S. business community. But distress over China's human rights policies and weapons proliferation record has limited Clinton's ability to muster popular and political support, as demonstrated by scattered street protests, Jiang's chilly reception from members of Congress and the refusal of New York's leading political figures to greet him. . . . . On issues other than human rights, administration officials had the experience of preparing for carrying out the summit and brought the two countries toward a much closer working relationship.</p> </li> </ul> |
| Economics and Trade        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Energy Woes may bring cooperation (Oct 29, 1997, <i>The Washington Post</i>) <p>As the first U.S.-China summit in Washington in more than a decade opens today, the Clinton administration has seized on China's energy crisis as a key to forging cooperation on a broad range of economic, environmental and security issues. . . . . China's explosive economic growth has created skyrocketing demands for oil and electricity and an acute need to clean its air and water, administration officials and independent analysts said. The Chinese are seeking international sources of oil, nuclear power plants and clean-burning factories, supplying leverage for U.S. policymakers and a potential windfall of billions of dollars for U.S. energy companies.</p> </li> </ul> |   |

Figure 11: U.S.-China Pacts reached in Shadow of Discord on Right. October 20, 1997. *The Washington Post*.



China's Jiang defended 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. Clinton said China is on "wrong side of history."

Figure 11 showed two leaders standing together with the same gesture—both of them were waving hands to express their opinions but they looked in two different directions, which expressed a special moment for a disagreeable personal or national opinion. The photographer chose this angle and moment to match the title of the text report –“discord on the right”, which referred to China’s attitude towards the 1989 Tiananmen Issue. The U.S. government thought that Jiang should “apologize,” but China had its own reason and own national situation to process the decision. So this picture is a good one showing the two nations’ relationship by presenting leaders’ gestures during the visit.

In Figure 12, famous actor Richard Gere was waving to demonstrators, whose few phrases in Tibetan drew cheers from many in the crowd. This photo is a good example in showing tension on human right topics during Jiang’s visit.





Figure 12: Human Rights debate Dominates News Conference. October 20, 1997. *The Washington Post*.



Investors monitor share prices in Hong Kong, where stocks have fallen 30 percent this month.

Figure 13: Sell-Off in Hong Kong Shakes Global Markets; Stock Plunge, Dollar Link Pose Test for new Chinese rulers. October 24, 1997. *The Washington Post*.

Figure 13 portrayed public interests in the financial markets. Shocked by Asia Financial Crisis, as both the finance center and newly returned part of China, Hong Kong and the entire China and Asia economy was a popular topic during Jiang's visit.

### **Zhu Rongji's 1999 visit—a key visit to ease China-U.S. friction in military power and China's entry to WTO**

Relations between the U.S. and China were severely strained for a time by the NATO Bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999. The United States attributed it to an intelligence error but China believed it to be deliberate. This bombing tremendously hurt China-U.S. relations. By the end of 1999, relations gradually began to improve. In October 1999 the two sides reached agreement on humanitarian payments for families of those who died and those who were injured as well as payments for damages to respective diplomatic properties in Belgrade and China. However, the United States has not yet apologized for the bombing. The United States was waging a war in Yugoslavia that China stridently opposed while China is under attack in the United States for allegedly stealing nuclear weapons secrets. Zhu Rongji, who had lots of important tasks during his visit, would aim at China's application to join the World Trade Organization, which could easily be subverted by political wrangling.

During this sixth state visit, Table 34 shows the three most dominant frames: economics and trade (49.1%), leadership personality (17.0%) and military (11.3%). These frames exactly reflected top issues for the China-U.S. relationship before and discussed during Zhu's visit. The overall tone for this visit is a neutral 1.83. The tone result showed that in this time period the China-U.S. relationship was mixed. During the sixth state visit, Table 35 shows there were 19 photos published, which is a 7.4% of all 257 photos. The number of photos ranks third among all eight visits. A total of 18 (94.7%) photos appeared to the interior pages, and the overall tone for this period is neutral, the same as for text. Although the China-U.S. relationship was experiencing problems, Zhu Rongji, as a charming leader, helped created a

more positive image for China. “People attending official functions and programs” (47.4%) and “Chinese people’s lives” (21.1%) are the most frequent frames. Before the 1999 key visit, the China-U.S. trade deficit, the Taiwan problem, and China’s ballistic-missile buildup made relations between Washington and Beijing frostier than they had been for years, and some in Congress were even talking as if China were the new cold war enemy. However, Zhu’s charming personality and firm style gained wide popularity even though the WTO agreement hadn’t been signed. His visit greatly accelerated China’s entry into the WTO two years later.

Table 34: Text summary of Zhu’s 1999 visit

| Visit                   | Variable              | Number/Percentage or specific values   | Note  |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|--|---|
| 1999 Zhu Rongji’s visit | Frequency             | 53 (11.3% of all visits )              | Rank 4th among 8 visits                                     |
|                         | Front page placement  | 10 (18.9% of the 1979 visit )          | Rank 5th among 8 visits                                     |
|                         |                       | Economics and trade                    |   |
|                         | Top 3 Dominant Frames | Leadership Personality<br>Military     |   |
|                         |                       | Economics and trade                    |   |
|                         | Top 3 Total Frames    | Leadership Personality<br>Human Rights |   |
|                         | Overall Tone          | Neutral with the value 1.83            | Rank 4th in positive tone (2nd neutral tone) among 8 visits |

Table 35: Photo summary of Zhu’s 1999 visit

| Visit                   | Variable                      | Number/Percentage or specific values  | Note   |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------|---|--|
| 1999 Zhu Rongji’s visit | Frequency                     | 19 (17.4% of all photos)  | Rank 4th among 8 visits                                |
|                         | Front page placement          | 1 (19.3% of the 1979 visit)   | Rank 8th among 8 visits                                |
|                         | Top 3 Target people in photos | Chinese officials<br>Top officials from both sides<br>Chinese people in China/Chinese people in America |  |
|                         |                               | Leaders attending official functions and programs   |  |
|                         | Top 3 Frames                  | Chinese people’s lives<br>Leaders attending cultural functional program                                 |  |
|                         | Overall Tone                  | Neutral with the value 1.79   | Rank 6th in positive tone (2nd neutral) among 8 visits |

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Representative text is shown in Table 36.

Table 36: Zhu's 1999 visit dominant frames example

| Media                      | Frames                 | Report examples  |
|----------------------------|------------------------|--|
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | Economics and Trade    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> <p>Talks Fail On China's Entry Into Trade Unit; Zhu Blames U.S. Political Climate (April 09, 1999, <i>The Washington Post</i>)</p> <p>A summit meeting between President Clinton and Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji ended yesterday without an agreement for U.S. support for Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization and Zhu pointedly blamed the failure on the "political atmosphere" in Washington.</p> <p>Zhu and Clinton said they were committed to working out a final agreement on China's entry to the WTO, important to China's stature in the international arena and to American companies seeking greater access to the Chinese market, by the end of the year.</p> <p>But Zhu's visit and the two leaders' lengthy news conference yesterday made clear that U.S.-China relations, which appeared to be on a path to improvement a year ago, are mired in a series of controversies over spying, human rights, Taiwan and allegations that China tried to influence U.S. elections through improper campaign contributions. .... The only progress to come out of Zhu's visit was on the trade front. The administration released a list of pledges by Beijing to open the Chinese market to foreign products, including sharp tariff cuts, the removal of barriers to U.S. citrus and wheat exports, new openings for American insurance companies and the dismantling of the state-run trading and distribution companies foreign firms are forced to use.</p> <p>"We made significant progress toward bringing China into the World Trade Organization on fair commercial terms, although we are not quite there yet," Clinton said. Zhu called the gaps "very small."</p> </li> </ul> |
|                            | Leadership Personality | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> <p>Chinese Premier Zhu arrives in U.S. as 'partnership' is frayed (April 7, 1999, <i>The Washington Post</i>)</p> <p>Just nine months ago, President Clinton went to Beijing and asserted that China and the U.S. enjoyed a "strategic partnership" that would bridge the differences between the two countries. But as Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji arrived yesterday in Los Angeles, he found that strategic partnership under attack by those here who believe China poses a military and economic threat while violating human rights standards that Americans value.</p> <p>The inauspicious climate for Zhu, who moves on to Washington tonight, goes beyond a Clinton administration distracted by war in Yugoslavia and a Chinese government upset over the NATO bombing campaign.</p> <p>Many Chinese Foreign Ministry officials urged Zhu to postpone his visit in light of the hostile atmosphere. However, China's deputy mission chief in Washington, Liu Xiaoming, said in an interview that "when relations are good, we need high-level visits. When there are difficulties, we need them all the more. We need leaders to provide leadership."</p> <p>If any Chinese leader can provide that sort of leadership, it is Zhu, the economic reformer, widely recognized as capable and blunt-spoken. Zhu will try to put an appealing face on a government that has left behind its worst human rights abuses yet continues to crush dissident voices to protect the Communist party's monopoly power.</p> </li> </ul>   |
|                            | Military               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> <p>Zhu ready to face critics on U.S. trip (April 5, 1999 <i>The Washington Post</i>)</p> <p>The United States is waging a war in Yugoslavia that China stridently opposes. China is under attack in the United States for allegedly stealing nuclear weapons secrets and for launching a new crackdown against dissent.</p> </li> </ul>  |



Figure 14: Zhu Rongji is ready for a cool welcome in the U.S. this week. But if he can't reform China, who can? April 12, 1999. *Time*.

Figure 14 is a very sharp picture. Never hesitating and very proactive, Zhu has a reform style and follows policy strictly while caring about people's lives. This picture showed his personality, and the caption "red star" is high praise for him from the U.S. media.

**Wen Jiabao's 2003 visit—a productive visit on reaching a common goal on the sensitive Taiwan issue**

China-U.S. relations changed radically following the September 11, 2001, attacks and then remained remarkably smooth after that. China offered strong public support for the war on terrorism. In the United States, the 911 terrorist attacks greatly changed the nature of discourse. It was no longer plausible to argue that China was the primary security threat to the United States, and the need to focus on the Middle East and the War on Terror made it a priority for the

United States to avoid potential distractions in East Asia.

Economically, China's "peaceful rise" was a clear declaration that its economic growth would not be any kind of threat towards other countries. Meanwhile, the steady cooperation in the fight against terrorism, plus co-working with the United States on eliminating North Korea's nuclear weapons program showed China's sincerity. However, the trade deficit and Taiwan remain sensitive issues today.

Taiwan remains a volatile issue, but one that remains under control. On occasion the United States has rebuked Taiwan's Chen Shui-bian for provocative pro-independence rhetoric. In 2005, China passed an anti-secession law which stated that China would be prepared to resort to "non-peaceful means" if Taiwan declared formal independence. And U.S. relations with Taiwan have been plagued by the United States' minimal military spending and weapons deliveries to Taiwan.

Under these circumstances, China's new premier Wen Jiabao came to the States in 2003. He stressed that the essence of China's road to peace relied on its own efforts for development. "China today is a country in reform and opening-up and a power rising dedicated to peace," he emphasized. "China tomorrow will continue to be a major country that loves peace and has a great deal to look forward to." (Wen, 2003) Wen proposed resolving the problem of the trade deficit through reciprocity, equal consultation and further growth of trade and economic cooperation, and Bush voiced his full endorsement. Wen also reiterated the Chinese government's basic policy on the Taiwan issue, and President Bush promised that the United States will adhere to the one-China policy, abide by the three U.S.-China joint communiqués and oppose Taiwan's independence or any unilateral actions that seek to alter the status quo.



Table 37: Text summary of Wen's 2003 visit

| Visit                    | Variable              | Number/Percentage or specific values                 | Note   |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|--|--|
| 2003 Wen Jiaobao's visit | Frequency             | 28 (6.0% of all visits )                             | Rank 7th among 8 visits                                  |
|                          | Front page placement  | 4 (14.3% of the 1979 visit)                          | Rank 8th among 8 visits                                  |
|                          | Top 2 Dominant Frames | Economics and trade<br>Taiwan                        |  |
|                          | Top 3 Total Frames    | Economics and trade<br>Taiwan<br>Political Relations |  |
|                          | Overall Tone          | Neutral with the value 1.86                          | Rank 5th positive tone (3rd neutral tone) among 8 visits |

Table 38: Photo summary of Wen's 2003 visit

| Visit                    | Variable                      | Number/Percentage or specific values   | Note                                     |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|--|--|
| 2003 Wen Jiaobao's visit | Frequency                     | 10 (3.9% of all photos)  | Rank 4th among 8 visits                  |
|                          | Front page placement          | 1 (10% of the 1979 visit)  | Rank 6th among 8 visits                  |
|                          | Top 2 Target people in photos | Top officials from both sides<br>Chinese people from China   |  |
|                          | Top 3 Dominant Frames         | People attending official functions and programs<br>Chinese people's lives/greeting<br>Chinese leaders |  |
|                          | Overall Tone                  | Positive with the value 1.50   | Rank 3rd in positive tone among 8 visits |

Table 37 shows that during this seventh state visit the two dominant frames were economics and trade (42.9%), and Taiwan (17.0%). These frames exactly reflected top issues for the U.S.-China relationship before and discussed during Wen's visit.

The overall text tone for this visit is a neutral 1.86.

During the sixth state visit, Table 38 shows there were 10 photos published, which is 3.9% of all 257 photos. This number ranks sixth among all eight visits so the photo coverage was not intensive during Wen's visit. Nine (90.0%) photos appeared on interior pages, and the overall tone for this period is positive, more positive than the text tone (neutral). The text with trade and Taiwan news always is more negative because the United States is concerned with its trade deficit and Taiwan security. However, the pictures only briefly showed

trade-related information with Chinese factories and Taiwan-related information. For the most part, the two top leaders smiled together and reached the consensus that Taiwan's referendum should not be held. Because formal talk about Taiwan between the leaders and China's economic situation were the most important issues, "people attending official functions and programs" (50%) and "Chinese people's lives" (20%) are the most frequent frames.

Representative text is shown in Table 39:



Figure 15: Over Trade. –As China becomes the world's factory, U.S. manufacturers are getting hurt. Do the Chinese play fair? The answer is more complex than you might imagine. December 22, 2003. *Time*.

Figure 15 portrayed a bra maker working in a Chinese factory. Curious about what life of textile workers from China is like, the text brought discussion of the possible connection between this and layoffs in U.S. textile factories. This photo is a vivid illustration of the two nations' trade deficit problem.



BY MICHAEL ROBINSON-CHAVEZ—THE WASHINGTON POST  
Visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and President Bush greet onlookers at the White House.

Figure 16: President Warns Taiwan On Independence Efforts; Bush Says Referendum on China Should Not Be Held. December 10, 2003, *The Washington Post*.

In Figure 16, two leaders are standing together and waving their hands in the same gesture. They looked pretty good, showing a satisfied talk/meeting with each other on the Taiwan issue.

Table 39: Wen's 2003 visit dominant frames example

| Media                      | Frames              | Report examples  |
|----------------------------|---------------------|--|
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | Taiwan              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Independence Efforts; Bush Says Referendum on China Should Not Be Held (<i>The Washington Post</i>, December 10, 2003.)</li> </ul> <p>President Bush, with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at his side in the Oval Office, delivered a firm warning yesterday to the Taiwanese government over its aspirations for independence, telling the island's leaders not to pursue a referendum that has angered mainland China.</p> <p>Bush raised no objection when Wen said Bush had expressed his "opposition to Taiwan independence" -- a break from the policy of ambiguity the United States has had on the subject. Bush, in his remarks with Wen, made no specific criticism of China but declared that "the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose."</p> <p>Administration officials asserted after Bush's statement that there was no change in China policy, but the remarks in the Oval Office were a significant change in emphasis for the administration. Two years ago, it took an aggressive position toward China, saying the United States would "do whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan.</p> <p>Bush appeared to receive little tangible in exchange for his gesture. The two leaders, who also lunched together, discussed the two countries' trade imbalance, the way the value of Chinese currency is set, religious freedom and talks to defuse the nuclear crisis with North Korea. But the administration announced no concrete gains.</p> |
|                            | Economics and Trade | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Over Trade. --As China becomes the world's factory, U.S. manufacturers are getting hurt, Do the Chinese play fair? The answer is more complex than you might imagine. (<i>Time</i>, December 22, 2003.)</li> </ul> <p>Jerry Rowland feels the dragon breathing down his neck. He's the CEO of National textiles, a T-Shirt maker in a state that has lost more than 37,000 textile jobs since the U.S. lifted quotas on Chinese imports two years ago.....the trade spat risks escalating into a nasty war, especially if politicians try to make it a major campaign issue next year. ....last year China, at \$103 billion, surpassed Japan as the country with the largest trade surplus with the U.S.....the administration had a chance to raise some of these issues with Chinese premier Wen Jiabao when he visited Washington last week. ....the fact is, while all countries engage in trade practices that aren't always legit, China is not a particularly egregious trade cheat, few countries have embraced globalization at greater risk. The shutdown of inefficient state-owned plants has cost China tens of millions of factory jobs, with more to go.</p>  |

### **Hu Jintao's visit—An overall talk between the largest developing and developed countries, China and the U.S.**

By the time China's new President Hu Jintao visited the United States in 2006, economic partnership and global security were still hot and key topics for the bilateral relationship.

Economically, on the eve of President Hu Jintao's long-anticipated visit to Washington, critical economic policy issues loomed large for both the United States and China. Over the past two decades, China has been transformed into a major economic power and continues to

play a growing role in the global community. Its ascension is likely to be one of the most complex and vital foreign policy challenges for many years to come. Heated policy debates surround China on currency revaluation, the magnitude of global economic imbalances, the current U.S. account deficit, and the ongoing accumulation of U.S. financial securities by the Chinese central bank.

During this period of time, the U.S. jumped into the war in Iraq and continued its war on terrorism, and the Iran nuclear and North Korea nuclear threats were other security concerns. The United States wanted to gain support from China on these problems. On China's side, it supports the United States on many security issues in order to gain more support from the U.S. on the Taiwan Issue, although the situation of Taiwan remained unclear.

Human rights was mentioned many times during Hu's visit because of an unplanned incident: a Falun Gong activist suddenly shrieked "President Hu, your days are numbered!" and "President Bush, stop him from killing!" when President Hu was delivering a speech on the South Lawn. This incident was coded as "human rights" because the protestor's main purpose was to claim Falun Gong practitioners' rights in China.

Table 40 shows during this last/most recent state visit, three dominant frames were most frequent: economics and trade (32.4%), political relations (23.5%) and human rights (8.8%). These frames reflected the top issues for the China-U.S. relations before and discussed during Hu's visit. The overall tone for this visit is a neutral 2.15. China wanted to gain support from the U.S. on Taiwan, and Bush wanted to see more cooperation from China on nuclear problems in North Korea and Iran, the Chinese currency's value and the trade deficit with China.

Table 40: Text summary of Hu's 2006 visit

| Visit                  | Variable              | Number/Percentage or specific values   | Note   |
|------------------------|-----------------------|--|--|
| 2006 Hu Jintao's visit | Frequency             | 34 (7.2% of all visits )   | Rank 6th among 8 visits  |
|                        | Front page placement  | 6 (16.6% of the 1979 visit)  | Rank 7th among 8 visits  |
|                        | Top 3 Dominant Frames | Economics and trade<br>Political Relations<br>Human Rights<br>Economics and trade<br>Political Relations<br>Human Rights |  |
|                        | Overall Tone          | Neutral with the value 2.15  | Rank 7th in positive (5th neutral among 5 neutral) tone among 8 visits |

Table 41: Photo summary of Hu's 2006 visit

| Visit                  | Variable                      | Number/Percentage or specific values  | Note   |
|------------------------|-------------------------------|---|--|
| 2006 Hu Jintao's visit | Frequency                     | 19(7.4% of all photos)  | Rank 6th among 8 visits                                |
|                        | Front page placement          | 2(10.5% of the 1979 visit)  | Rank 7th among 8 visits                                |
|                        | Top 3 Target people in photos | Top officials from both sides<br>Chinese in America<br>Chinese official only                                      |  |
|                        | Top 3 Dominant Frames         | People attending official functions and programs<br>people demonstrating or protesting<br>Leader's head portraits |  |
|                        | Overall Tone                  | Neutral with the value 1.84   | Rank 7th in positive tone (3rd neutral) among 8 visits |

During the eighth state visit, table 41 shows there were 19 photos published, which is 7.4% of all 257 photos. The photos rank fourth among all eight visits. A total of 17 (89.5%) photos appeared on an interior page, and the overall tone for this period is neutral, the same as the text tone. But notice that Deng's 1979 visit is significantly different from Wan's 1989 visit and Hu's 2006 visit. Deng's 1979 visit had the most positive photo tone with a figure 1.20 while Hu's visit has the second most negative tone with a mean of 1.84. Lots of photos about the interruption by a Falun Gong activist during Hu's speech resulted in this tone.

“People attending official functions and programs” (36.8%), “people demonstrating or

protesting” (21.1%) and “Chinese people’s lives”(10.5%) are the most frequent frames.

Representative text is shown in Table 42.

Table 42: Hu’s 2006 visit dominant frames example

| Media                      | Frames              | Report examples   |
|----------------------------|---------------------|---|
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | Economics and Trade | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In Seattle, Hu Focuses on Trade and Cooperation; Chinese President Begins U.S. Trip (April 19, 2006, <i>The Washington Post</i>)           <p>Chinese President Hu Jintao arrived Tuesday in the Pacific Northwest where trade issues have been carefully massaged in recent days to put a cheery face on China’s chronic problems with software piracy, an undervalued currency and a soaring trade surplus with the United States.</p> <p>By kicking off his visit here, the Chinese president is focusing on a region where big-ticket trade -- for Boeing aircraft and Microsoft software -- is important to both the national and local economy. The Port of Seattle has been packed for nearly a decade with ships carrying goods to and from China.</p> </li> </ul>   |
|                            | Political Relations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chinese Leader Coming to U.S. Well Prepared; Planning Reflects Priority on Relations (April 18,2006 <i>The Washington Post</i>)           <p>The Chinese government has devoted intense energy into getting President Hu Jintao ready for this week’s visit to the United States, feeding intelligence, position papers and economic statistics to a leader famous for meticulous preparation.</p> <p>"We believe the China-U.S. relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world," said a senior Foreign Ministry official involved in the preparations.</p> </li> <li>Bush-Hu Meeting To Highlight Role That China Plays; Iran, North Korea at Top of the Agenda           <p>When President Bush sits down with Chinese President Hu Jintao this morning in the Oval Office, some of the biggest foreign policy challenges facing the United States will be on the table, including the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea.</p> <p>Increasingly, administration officials believe, the key to these issues and other overseas problems may lie in Beijing, a reflection of the pivotal position China has come to play on the international stage.</p> <p>China, consumed with domestic problems at home and eager for stability overseas, has long resisted playing a leading role in foreign policy. But, especially in the past year, the Bush administration has pressed China to shed its traditional neutrality and take a more aggressive stance against governments that U.S. officials believe could potentially threaten U.S. interests and, more broadly, the international system.</p> </li> </ul> |

Figure 17 shows a good relationship between China and the big U.S. companies. Hu met two entire days in Seattle with business leaders.



Figure 17: Bush-Hu meeting to highlight role that China plays. Upbeat on trade, Hu offers no new fixes for imbalance. April 20, 2006, *The Washington Post*.



Figure 18: No breakthroughs for Bush with President of China. April 21, 2006, *The Washington Post*.

Figure 18 shows demonstrator Wenyi Wang of New York, who loudly berated President Hu Jintao, being escorted from the South Lawn.



## Comparisons of the four publications

Table 43: Text Frequencies

|                            | Frequency | Percent | Mean Words | Total Words |
|----------------------------|-----------|---------|------------|-------------|
| New York Times             | 255       | 54.4    | 840.83     | 214412      |
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | 156       | 33.3    | 993.91     | 155050      |
| Time                       | 21        | 4.5     | 1548.29    | 32514       |
| Newsweek                   | 37        | 7.9     | 1154.16    | 42704       |
| Total                      | 469       | 100     | 948.14     | 444678      |

Table 44: Photo Frequencies

|                            | Frequency | Percent |
|----------------------------|-----------|---------|
| New York Times             | 83        | 32.3    |
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | 57        | 22.2    |
| Time                       | 48        | 18.7    |
| Newsweek                   | 69        | 26.8    |
| Total                      | 257       | 100     |

Table 45: Comparison of photo size by publications

|                            | PhotoSize  |            |              |             |                   |
|----------------------------|------------|------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------|
|                            | one column | two column | three column | four column | other, non-listed |
| <i>The New York Times</i>  | 9          | 30         | 33           | 11          | 0                 |
|                            | 10.80%     | 36.10%     | 39.80%       | 13.30%      | 0.00%             |
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | 13         | 23         | 15           | 6           | 0                 |
| Time                       | 24         | 14         | 7            | 1           | 2                 |
|                            | 22.80%     | 40.40%     | 26.30%       | 10.50%      | 0.00%             |
| Newsweek                   | 50         | 9          | 3            | 2           | 5                 |
|                            | 50.00%     | 29.20%     | 14.60%       | 2.10%       | 4.20%             |
|                            | 72.50%     | 13.00%     | 4.30%        | 2.90%       | 7.20%             |
|                            | 96         | 76         | 58           | 20          | 7                 |
|                            | 37.40%     | 29.60%     | 22.60%       | 7.80%       | 2.70%             |

The total words, total number of photos and size of photos in Tables 43, 44 and 45 provide a rough indicator of the eight state visits' importance in the four publications.

In the total of 469 articles, *The New York Times* covered the visits most intensively with 255 articles, more than half of the total. This was followed by the *Washington Post*, with 156. Together, the two newspapers printed 87.7% of all articles. Magazines print far fewer articles than newspapers because magazines are published weekly, which means there were only one

or two issues that covered stories about the Chinese leaders' visits. *Newsweek* had a total of 37 articles published and *Time* had the fewest with of 21 articles.

Of the total of 257 photos about the Chinese leaders' state visits, *The New York Times* also printed the most with 83 or 32.3% photos. But *Newsweek*, not the *The Washington Post*, ranked second with 69 photos (26.8%). The *The Washington Post* (22.2%) and *Time* (18.7%) used fewer photos. In general, the two magazines published relatively more photos than text, indicating more of an emphasis on visual framing. And the two magazines accounted for almost 17% of the total words printed about the state visits. *The New York Times* itself accounted for almost half (48%) of all words printed. The *The Washington Post* had 35% of the total words printed. With more than half of all articles, and almost half of all words, the dominant position of *The New York Times* can be seen. The four publications are all international in focus, but *The New York Times*' high intensity of coverage, compared to the other publications may indicate that *The New York Times* in general covers international news more than other publications.

*The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* accounted for the great majority of photos spanning more than one column, while the two news magazines emphasized one column photos.

In Tables 46 and 47, there were seven news sources coded, included the three largest news agencies from the United States, China and the United Kingdom, newspaper and magazine staff, the non-staff correspondents and UPI. "Special to the Times" refer to reports being done by the non-staff correspondents for *The New York Times*. For the text reports, "newspaper staff written" ranks at the top across publications with *The New York Times* at 59.6%, *The Washington Post* at 76.3%, *Time* at 100% and *Newsweek* at 89.2%. An additional

33.3% of *the New York Times* reports came from special correspondents. Newspapers relied more on wire services while magazines often did not identify the source of photos. For the photos, the U.S. news agency Associated Press and publications' own staff were two most popular sources, and *Time* had used Xinhua News Agency twice for photos.

Table 46: Comparison of text news sources by publications

|                            | Source           |                    |         |                         |                      |       |                    |
|----------------------------|------------------|--------------------|---------|-------------------------|----------------------|-------|--------------------|
|                            | Associated Press | Xinhua News Agency | Reuters | Newspaper Staff Written | Special to the Times | UPI   | Others, non-listed |
| <i>The New York Times</i>  | 6                | 0                  | 2       | 152                     | 85                   | 2     | 8                  |
|                            | 2.40%            | 0.00%              | 0.80%   | 59.60%                  | 33.30%               | 0.80% | 3.10%              |
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | 0                | 0                  | 0       | 119                     | 2                    | 0     | 35                 |
|                            | 0.00%            | 0.00%              | 0.00%   | 76.30%                  | 1.30%                | 0.00% | 22.40%             |
| <i>Time</i>                | 0                | 0                  | 0       | 21                      | 0                    | 0     | 0                  |
|                            | 0.00%            | 0.00%              | 0.00%   | 100.00%                 | 0.00%                | 0.00% | 0.00%              |
| <i>Newsweek</i>            | 0                | 0                  | 0       | 33                      | 0                    | 0     | 4                  |
|                            | 0.00%            | 0.00%              | 0.00%   | 89.20%                  | 0.00%                | 0.00% | 10.80%             |
|                            | 6                | 0                  | 2       | 325                     | 87                   | 2     | 47                 |
|                            | 1.30%            | 0.00%              | 0.40%   | 69.30%                  | 18.60%               | 0.40% | 10.00%             |

Table 47: Comparison of photo news sources by publications

|                            | Source           |                    |         |                         |                      |        |                    |
|----------------------------|------------------|--------------------|---------|-------------------------|----------------------|--------|--------------------|
|                            | Associated Press | Xinhua News Agency | Reuters | Newspaper Staff Written | Special to the Times | UPI    | Others, non-listed |
| <i>The New York Times</i>  | 26               | 0                  | 10      | 24                      | 1                    | 10     | 12                 |
|                            | 31.30%           | 0.00%              | 12.00%  | 28.90%                  | 1.20%                | 12.00% | 14.50%             |
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | 12               | 0                  | 7       | 27                      | 0                    | 1      | 10                 |
|                            | 21.10%           | 0.00%              | 12.30%  | 47.40%                  | 0.00%                | 1.80%  | 17.50%             |
| <i>Time</i>                | 4                | 2                  | 1       | 12                      | 0                    | 3      | 26                 |
|                            | 8.30%            | 4.20%              | 2.10%   | 25.00%                  | 0.00%                | 6.30%  | 54.20%             |
| <i>Newsweek</i>            | 0                | 0                  | 0       | 16                      | 0                    | 0      | 53                 |
|                            | 0.00%            | 0.00%              | 0.00%   | 23.20%                  | 0.00%                | 0.00%  | 76.80%             |
|                            | 42               | 2                  | 18      | 79                      | 1                    | 14     | 101                |
|                            | 16.30%           | 0.80%              | 7.00%   | 30.70%                  | 0.40%                | 5.40%  | 39.30%             |

Table 48: Comparison of text placement by publications

|                            | Section    |               | Total   |
|----------------------------|------------|---------------|---------|
|                            | Front Page | Interior Page |         |
| <i>The New York Times</i>  | 56         | 199           | 255     |
|                            | 22.00%     | 78.00%        | 100.00% |
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | 41         | 115           | 156     |
|                            | 26.30%     | 73.70%        | 100.00% |
| <i>Time</i>                | 14         | 7             | 21      |
|                            | 66.70%     | 33.30%        | 100.00% |
| <i>Newsweek</i>            | 23         | 14            | 37      |
|                            | 62.20%     | 37.80%        | 100.00% |
|                            | 134        | 335           | 469     |
|                            | 28.60%     | 71.40%        | 100.00% |

Table 49: Comparison of photo placement by publications

|                            | Section    |               | Total   |
|----------------------------|------------|---------------|---------|
|                            | Front Page | Interior Page |         |
| <i>The New York Times</i>  | 19         | 64            | 83      |
|                            | 22.90%     | 77.10%        | 100.00% |
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | 10         | 47            | 57      |
|                            | 17.50%     | 82.50%        | 100.00% |
| <i>Time</i>                | 29         | 19            | 48      |
|                            | 60.40%     | 39.60%        | 100.00% |
| <i>Newsweek</i>            | 56         | 13            | 69      |
|                            | 81.20%     | 18.80%        | 100.00% |
|                            | 114        | 143           | 257     |
|                            | 44.40%     | 55.60%        | 100.00% |

Results showed that there are different report placement strategies for newspapers and magazines including “front page” and “interior page”. For newspapers, “front page” was the first page of all the pages in the daily newspaper; the rest of them were coded as interior pages. For magazines, material featured either as a “cover story” or a longest report in the “international report” section was coded as “front page.” In percentage terms, tables 48 and 49 showed there were more text reports placed on the front page in the magazines than in the newspapers. Photo placements show the same trend. The method of classifying the longest magazine story in the international section as “front page” might need further consideration

because this placement might not be as important as the cover story in a magazine or a front page story in a newspaper. Thus weighing news importance by comparing placement might not be accurate. This method could be modified in the future by moving the longest magazine stories in the international section from “front page” to the “interior page” group for coding.

Table 50 shows the economics and trade frame, along with the political relations, human rights, leadership personality and Taiwan, were the top five most frequently coded dominant frames in the four major U.S. publications. However, each medium had its own preference in covering certain aspects of China. The top frame in both newspapers is economics and trade, while the top frame in both magazines is political relations. This result might be due to a magazine’s more in-depth and comprehensive style in covering content. Magazines tend to wrap up all important aspects in one feature article. In this way, one long article can cover and analyze news that happened in the past week or month and compete with the daily newspapers. So when magazines covered the Chinese leaders’ visits, all aspects were mentioned comprehensively and their impact on China-U.S. relations was analyzed in a smaller number of text reports.

For photos, Table 51 shows people attending official functions and programs, people demonstrating or protesting, Chinese people’s lives, people attending cultural programs and leaders’ head portraits are the top five most frequent photo frames. Perhaps because *the Washington Post* has distinguished itself through its reporting on the workings of the White House, Congress, and other aspects of the U.S. government, it has a larger proportion of photo frames in “People attending official functions and programs” than the other three publications. Second, people demonstrating or protesting the visiting leaders were presented

Table 50: Comparison of text frames by publications

|                            | Economics and trade | Taiwan | Communism and ideology | Political relations | Culture and history | Leadership personality | Military | China borders and neighbors | Human rights | Censorship | China-US-Soviet relationship | Others | Total  |
|----------------------------|---------------------|--------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------|----------|-----------------------------|--------------|------------|------------------------------|--------|--------|
| <i>The New York Times</i>  | 69                  | 19     | 1                      | 29                  | 4                   | 24                     | 11       | 10                          | 35           | 1          | 8                            | 44     | 255    |
|                            | 27.1%               | 7.5%   | 0.4%                   | 11.4%               | 1.6%                | 9.4%                   | 4.3%     | 3.9%                        | 13.7%        | 0.4%       | 3.1%                         | 17.3%  | 100.0% |
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | 28                  | 13     | 4                      | 23                  | 8                   | 12                     | 8        | 6                           | 25           | 1          | 3                            | 25     | 156    |
|                            | 17.9%               | 8.3%   | 2.6%                   | 14.7%               | 5.1%                | 7.7%                   | 5.1%     | 3.8%                        | 16.0%        | 0.6%       | 1.9%                         | 16.0%  | 100.0% |
| <i>Time</i>                | 1                   | 0      | 3                      | 8                   | 0                   | 4                      | 0        | 0                           | 1            | 0          | 4                            | 0      | 21     |
|                            | 4.8%                | 0.0%   | 14.3%                  | 38.1%               | 0.0%                | 19.0%                  | 0.0%     | 0.0%                        | 4.8%         | 0.0%       | 19.0%                        | 0.0%   | 100.0% |
| <i>Newsweek</i>            | 4                   | 3      | 0                      | 8                   | 0                   | 5                      | 2        | 0                           | 6            | 0          | 1                            | 8      | 37     |
|                            | 10.8%               | 8.1%   | 0.0%                   | 21.6%               | 0.0%                | 13.5%                  | 5.4%     | 0.0%                        | 16.2%        | 0.0%       | 2.7%                         | 21.6%  | 100.0% |
| Total                      | 102                 | 35     | 8                      | 68                  | 12                  | 45                     | 21       | 16                          | 67           | 2          | 16                           | 77     | 469    |
|                            | 21.7%               | 7.5%   | 1.7%                   | 14.5%               | 2.6%                | 9.6%                   | 4.5%     | 3.4%                        | 14.3%        | 0.4%       | 3.4%                         | 16.4%  | 100.0% |

Table 51: Comparison of photo dominant frames by publications

|                            | Categories                        |  |                        |                        |                          |                                    |                   | Total         |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------|
|                            | People attending cultural program | People attending official functions and programs | Leader's head portrait | Chinese people's lives | Greeting Chinese leaders | People demonstrating or protesting | other, non-listed |               |
| <i>The New York Times</i>  | 12<br>14.5%                       | 26<br>31.3%                                      | 8<br>9.6%              | 8<br>9.6%              | 4<br>4.8%                | 25<br>30.1%                        | 0<br>0.0%         | 83<br>100.0%  |
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | 4<br>7.0%                         | 24<br>42.1%                                      | 10<br>17.5%            | 3<br>5.3%              | 1<br>1.8%                | 15<br>26.3%                        | 0<br>0.0%         | 57<br>100.0%  |
| <i>Time</i>                | 9<br>18.8%                        | 9<br>18.8%                                       | 9<br>18.8%             | 5<br>10.4%             | 0<br>0.0%                | 16<br>33.3%                        | 0<br>0.0%         | 48<br>100.0%  |
| <i>Newsweek</i>            | 5<br>7.2%                         | 18<br>26.1%                                      | 3<br>4.3%              | 25<br>36.2%            | 0<br>0.0%                | 17<br>24.6%                        | 1<br>1.4%         | 69<br>100.0%  |
| Total                      | 30<br>11.7%                       | 77<br>30.0%                                      | 30<br>11.7%            | 41<br>16.0%            | 5<br>1.9%                | 73<br>28.4%                        | 1<br>0.4%         | 257<br>100.0% |

more often than most other categories, which might suggest that publications were more likely to use photos showing negative moments. *Newsweek* paid more attention to Chinese people's lives in their pictures, while the newspapers published more pictures of leaders attending official functions and programs. This might be due to the newspaper's emphasis on daily events while magazines can analyze the visits comprehensively by providing more background information from Chinese people.

Table 52: Comparison of text tones by publications

|                            | Positive      | Neutral       | Negative      | Total          | Average | Tone    |
|----------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------|---------|
| <i>The New York Times</i>  | 104<br>40.80% | 80<br>31.40%  | 71<br>27.80%  | 255<br>100.00% | 1.87    | Neutral |
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | 52<br>33.30%  | 58<br>37.20%  | 46<br>29.50%  | 156<br>100.00% | 1.96    | Neutral |
| <i>Time</i>                | 11<br>52.40%  | 3<br>14.30%   | 7<br>33.30%   | 21<br>100.00%  | 1.80    | Neutral |
| <i>Newsweek</i>            | 9<br>24.30%   | 16<br>43.20%  | 12<br>32.40%  | 37<br>100.00%  | 2.08    | Neutral |
| Total                      | 176<br>37.50% | 157<br>33.50% | 136<br>29.00% | 469<br>100.00% | 1.91    | Neutral |

Note: One-way ANOVA Table has  $F=1.979$ ,  $Sig=0.118$

Table 53: Comparison of photo tones by publications

|                            | Positive | Neutral | Negative | Total   | Average | Tone    |
|----------------------------|----------|---------|----------|---------|---------|---------|
| <i>The New York Times</i>  | 42       | 21      | 20       | 83      | 1.73    | Neutral |
|                            | 50.60%   | 25.30%  | 24.10%   | 100.00% |         |         |
| <i>The Washington Post</i> | 24       | 20      | 13       | 57      | 1.81    | Neutral |
|                            | 42.10%   | 35.10%  | 22.80%   | 100.00% |         |         |
| <i>Time</i>                | 17       | 14      | 17       | 48      | 2.00    | Neutral |
|                            | 35.40%   | 29.20%  | 35.40%   | 100.00% |         |         |
| <i>Newsweek</i>            | 45       | 5       | 19       | 69      | 1.62    | Neutral |
|                            | 65.20%   | 7.20%   | 27.50%   | 100.00% |         |         |
|                            | 128      | 60      | 69       | 257     | 1.77    | Neutral |
|                            | 49.80%   | 23.30%  | 26.80%   | 100.00% |         |         |

Note: One-way ANOVA Table has  $F=1.059$ ,  $Sig=0.366$

According to the one-way ANOVA test displayed in Table 52 and Table 53, there's no significant difference in the amount of positive, negative and neutral tones across both the four media in texts and photos. However, the 7.2% of neutral tones in *Newsweek* showed that this magazine probably has a less neutral, with more positive and negative photos.



## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS

Overall, U.S. media provided balanced text coverage with both positive and negative items in most stories. The four media tended to be “objective” in their coverage in that they often used both negative and positive material in text about China and Chinese leaders. Most of the overall tone classifications were neutral, indicating that most of the time, media were not tilting to the positive or the negative sides. Exceptions occurred when protests were occurring, or when the first visit occurred. Visits that had the “human rights” frame as the most important one had comparatively more negative tones, which means this issue was still a big barrier between the two countries. Tones were more positive in visits before 1989 than those paid after 1989. One reason was due to the Tiananmen Square Incident. Another was due to the fast developing of the Chinese economy after 1990s and the trade deficit and economic competition between the two countries. Here an interesting conclusion can be made: although in the global village, each nation has to depend on each other, they are facing more intense economic competition.

Photos tend to be more positive than text, perhaps as a result of planned news photo opportunities carefully controlled by governments. Many controlled photos were focusing on the visiting leaders who were happily facing and talking with each other in the conferences and different communication occasions. However, two visits show that demonstrators or events in the country (Tiananmen) can overwhelm efforts to control photo coverage, sending it in a negative direction. Human rights protests are especially effective in getting attention from U.S. news media. Results suggest that when human rights issues are salient, as is the case comments due to events in Tibet, it can be expected a Chinese leader’s state visit to the

United States would generate both text and photo criticisms toward him. Chinese leaders would be well-advised not to visit during period of human right conflicts.

Underlying economic and political factors guide coverage under normal conditions, but there are deviations caused by protests, leadership characteristics, etc. The results of the analysis of the study showed that there is not a perfect fit between the underlying economic and political situation and the patterns of coverage for state visits. Exceptions apparently occur when unexpected incidents take place, such as a protestor who suddenly appeared to raise the issue of Falun Gong during Hu Jintao's 2006 visit. And exceptions occur when the coming leaders have exceptional characteristics like Zhu Rongji and Deng Xiaoping.

*The New York Times* is the giant in terms of quantity of coverage. Just the bulk of coverage assures that it plays an important role. This study did not attempt to determine if other media follow *The New York Times* or not. *The New York Times* was the publication that had the most articles and words, and this might be due to its comprehensive reporting style and greater interests in exploring China as an international newspaper. Magazines tended to summarize a week's events in terms of their political meaning rather than focusing on specific economic or trade issue, so the political frame existed more in magazines than in newspapers.

Leaders who can take advantage of cultural opportunities to fit in and emphasize with citizens when visiting will often be portrayed in a more positive light. Wearing western hats or hugging children are examples.

Levels of coverage are uneven across time, perhaps decreasing somewhat. The first visit attracted the most attention. Judging by the number of words/size of photos, number of articles and photos, text/photo front page placement, the levels of information richness all

support the conclusion that Deng's 1979 visit, Wan's 1989 visit and Jiang's 1997 visit were the top three visits in terms of attracting the largest amount of interest from the U.S. reporters, which might indicate that these three were the most important visits from the reporters' perspectives.

U.S. media do not tend to use Chinese sources for photos. The coding results of news sources indicated that the U.S. media liked to use domestic services rather than Chinese sources. However, reporters still quoted lots of Chinese people, indicating that they liked to listen to Chinese people more than listening to Chinese media.

### **Limitations of the study**

The frames in text and photos were different so reporters' framing couldn't be directly compared in terms of dominant frames. Due to the fact that the state visit photos focus on visiting leaders and routine visiting procedures, official functions, it was hard to use frames such as "political relations," "economics and trade" and "Taiwan" in photos. Future studies should also include the captions of the photos in order to identify more specific frames to match the text frames. However, with the photos occupying more and more space in today's media, and the neglect of text by the readers, it is a time to think about how to cope with this limitation in the future studies.

Two Chinese graduate students who were fluent in both Chinese and English were coded items for this study. In the future, it would be interesting to have some coders from China, and others from the United States to see what differences might emerge.

Finally, the method of classifying the longest magazine story in the international section as "front page" might need further consideration because this placement might not be as important as the cover story in the magazine or the front page stories in the newspapers.

## APPENDIX

## CONTENT ANALYSIS CODING SHEET

| <b>(1)Quantitative Text</b>   |                 |  |      |
|---|-----------------|--|------|
|   | Variable        | Instructions and values  | Code |
|   | ID              | Number each individual story consecutively   |      |
|   | Coder           | Coder's first name   |      |
| 1   | Name            | Newspaper or magazine Title:<br>1=New York Times<br>3= <i>The Washington Post</i><br>4=Time<br>5=Newsweek                                      |      |
| 2   | Headline        | Enter a string variable  |      |
| 3   | Date            | Date of story publication. Enter as year, month, day<br>(Ex:20070205)  |      |
| 4   | Author          | Enter a string variable  |      |
| 5   | Source          | 1=Associate Press<br>2=Xinhua News Agency<br>3=Reuters<br>4=newspaper stuff written<br>5=Special to the Times<br>6=UPI<br>99=non-listed, other |      |
| 6   | Section         | 2= front page<br>1= interior page for international/world/global/local news  |      |
| 7   | Number of Words | Count as it is   |      |
| <p>To analyze emotional response to Chinese leaders' visits/China, three kinds of emotions are operationalized. One is negative, defined like blame or criticism toward certain aspects or historical events of China. Blame was indicated by any adjective such as 'outdated' 'backward' 'cruel' 'demolished' or 'autocratic' and noun such like 'Tiananmen massacre', 'censorship' or 'military expand' that the U.S. holds potential hostility towards China. The second type was positive emotions, like 'development' 'better' 'modernized' or 'pragmatic' and nouns like 'opening policy' and 'growing democracy'. The third aspect was neutral. Neutral can be defined as the mix description of the image and event like 'Chinese government would like to see its citizens experience the new economic development while it still put strict censorship on certain areas.' Adjectives on both good and bad sides mixed together in one article will be coded as neutral.</p> |                 |  |      |
| 8   | Tone text(I)    | Is there any positive description about China and Chinese leaders in this report?  |      |

|  |                |  |  |
|--|----------------|--|--|
|  |                | 1=Yes<br>0=No  |  |
| 9  | Tone text(II)  | Is there any negative description about China and Chinese leaders in this report?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No                           |  |
| 10   | Tone text(III) | What is the overall assessment tone about China and Chinese leaders in this report?<br>3=positive<br>2=neutral<br>1=negative |  |
| Lists are all frames that might be detected. The political relation, the economic relation and trade, the Chinese leader's head portrait, the ideological differences, the Taiwan issue, 911, any big issues happened in China, US or internationally during the state visits. |                |  |  |
| 11   | Frame text     | Is the frame "Economics and trade" appeared in the text?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No  |  |
| 12   | Frame text     | Is the frame "Taiwan" appeared in the text?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No   |  |
| 13   | Frame text     | Is the frame "Communism and ideology" appeared in the text?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No   |  |
| 14   | Frame text     | Is the frame "Political Relation" appeared in the text?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No   |  |
| 15   | Frame text     | Is the frame "Culture and history" appeared in the text?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No  |  |
| 16   | Frame text     | Is the frame "Leadership Personality" appeared in the text?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No   |  |
| 17   | Frame text     | Is the frame "Military Power and strategy" appeared in the text?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No  |  |
| 18   | Frame text     | Is the frame "China borders and neighbors" appeared in the text?   |  |

|    |                    |   |  |
|----|--------------------|---|--|
|    |                    | 1=Yes<br>0=No   |  |
| 19 | Frame text         | Is the frame “911” appeared in the text?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No   |  |
| 20 | Frame text         | Is the frame “human right” appeared in the text?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No   |  |
| 21 | Dominant Frame     | What is the dominant frame of the text?<br>1=Economics and Trade<br>2= Taiwan<br>3= Communism and ideology<br>4= Political Relation<br>5= Culture and history<br>6= Leadership Personality<br>7= Military Power and strategy<br>8= China borders and neighbors<br>9=911<br>10=human right<br>11=censorship<br>12=China-US-Soviet Relationahip<br>99=non-listed, other |  |
| 22 | Who do they quote? | Is Chinese government official quoted in this report?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No  |  |
| 23 | Who do they quote? | Is US government official quoted in this report?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No   |  |
| 24 | Who do they quote? | Is Chinese economist quoted in this report?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No  |  |
| 25 | Who do they quote? | Is US economist quoted in this report?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No   |  |
| 26 | Who do they quote? | Is Chinese diplomatist quoted in this report?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No  |  |
| 27 | Who do they quote? | Is US diplomatist quoted in this report?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No   |  |
| 28 | Who do they quote? | Is Chinese public quoted in this report?<br>1=Yes   |  |

|                              |                         |   |      |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|---|------|
|                              |                         | 0=No  |      |
| 29                           | Who do they quote?      | Is US public quoted in this report?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No  |      |
| 30                           | Who do they quote?      | Is Chinese business representative in society quoted in this report?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No   |      |
| 31                           | Who do they quote?      | Is US business representative in society quoted in this report?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No  |      |
| 32                           | Who do they quote?      | Is Chinese media quoted in this report?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No  |      |
| 33                           | Who do they quote?      | Is US media quoted in this report?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No   |      |
| 34                           | Who else do they quote? | Listed are people quoted other than sources above   |      |
| <b>(2)Quantitative Image</b> |                         |   |      |
|                              | Variable                | Instructions and values   | Code |
|                              | ID                      | Number each individual story consecutively  |      |
|                              | Coder                   | Coder's first name  |      |
| 1                            | Name                    | Newspaper or magazine Title:<br>1=New York Times<br>3= <i>The Washington Post</i><br>4=Time<br>5=Newsweek   |      |
| 2                            | Date                    | Date of story publication. Enter as year, month, day<br>(Ex:20070205)   |      |
| 3                            | Photographer            | Enter a string variable   |      |
| 4                            | Source                  | 1=Associate Press<br>2=Xinhua News Agency<br>3=Reuters<br>4=newspaper stuff written (Enter Name appeared in newspaper)<br>5=Special to the Times<br>6=UPI<br>99=non-listed, other |      |
| 5                            | Section                 | 1= front page<br>2= interior page for international/world/global/local news   |      |

|   |               |   |  |
|---|---------------|---|--|
| 6   | Story         | Is the photo published with a text story?<br>1=Yes<br>0=No  |  |
| 7   | StoryHeadline | Enter a string variable   |  |
| 8   | Photosize     | Number of columns the photo occupied<br>1=one column<br>2=tow column<br>3=three column<br>4=four column<br>5=five column<br>6=six column<br>7=other number of columns<br>99=non-listed, other   |  |
| 9   | Caption       | Categorize story as<br>1=independent photos with explanation<br>2= independent photos with no explanation   |  |
| 10  | Leader        | Who is the leader captured in the photo? Enter a string variable.   |  |
| 11  | Visit         | Which visit the photo is presenting for?<br>1=1979 Deng<br>2=1984 Zhao<br>3=1985 Li<br>4=1989 Wan<br>5=1997 Jiang<br>6=1999 Zhu<br>7=2003 Wen<br>8=2006 Hu  |  |
| 12  | People        | Who are the people captured in the photos?<br>1=top officials from both sides<br>2=Chinese officials only<br>3=US officials only<br>4=American people & Chinese leaders<br>5=Chinese people in China<br>6=Chinese in America<br>7=Chinese leaders and leaders from other countries(not from America)<br>99=others |  |
| <p>To analyze emotional response to Chinese leaders' image, three kinds of emotions are operationalized. One is negative, defined like blame emotion expressed through the camera. For example, persecuted students gave announcement of their against attitudes towards the government or tank went to Tiananmen against the citizens. And grief or worried expression that shown with crying expressions will be coded as negative ones. Captions indicated words like 'outdated 'backward' 'cruel' 'demolished' or 'autocratic' and noun such like 'Tiananmen massacre', 'censorship' or 'military expand' will be coded as negative, too. The second type was positive images, for example, Chinese</p> |               |   |  |



|  |                 |   |  |
|--|-----------------|---|--|
| <p>leaders kissing children, celebrating with citizens and communicating with U.S .cultures, words in caption like ‘humanity’, ‘development’, ‘better’, ‘modernized’ or ‘pragmatic’ and nouns like ‘opening policy’ and ‘growing democracy’. The third aspect was neutral. Neutral can be a no emotion or expressions shown in the image like an official’s head portrait or Chinese leaders step off the airplane and waved to public may not show any emotion.</p> |                 |   |  |
| 13   | Tone image(I)   | Is there any positive demonstration about China and Chinese leaders in this report?<br>1=Yes<br>2=No  |  |
| 14   | Tone image(II)  | Is there any negative demonstration about China and Chinese leaders in this report?<br>1=Yes<br>2=No  |  |
| 15   | Tone image(III) | What is the overall assessment tone about China and Chinese leaders in this photo?<br>1=positive<br>2=negative<br>3=neutral   |  |
| List the dominant frame appeared in the photo.   |                 |   |  |
| 16   | Frame photo     | What is the most emphasized frame about China and Chinese leaders in this report?<br>1= People attending cultural program<br>2= people attending official functions and programs<br>3= leader’s head portrait<br>4= Chinese people’s lives<br>5= Greeting Chinese leaders<br>6= people demonstrating or protesting<br><br>99=others, not listed |  |

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